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Secure Information Systems (SIS) design paradigms have evolved in generations to adapt
to IS security needs. However, modern IS are still vulnerable and are far from secure. The
development of an underlying IS cannot be reduced to “technological fixes” neither is the
design of SIS. Technical security cannot ensure IS security. Generations of SIS design
paradigms have evolved, all with their own sets of shortcomings. A SIS design paradigm
must meet well-defined requirements, yet contemporary paradigms do not meet all these
requirements. Current SIS design paradigms are not easily applicable to IS. They lack a
comprehensive modeling support and ignore the socio-technical organizational role of IS
security. This research introduced the use of action research in design science research.
Design science paradigm was leveraged to introduce a meta-design artifact explaining
how IS requirements including security requirements can be incorporated in the design of
SIS. The introduced artifact CSIS provided design comprehensiveness to emergent and
changing requirements to IS from a socio-technical perspective. The CSIS artifact meets
secure system meta-design requirements. This study presented a secure IS design
principle that ensures IS security.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. Introduction
The advances in network communication introduced growing use of global
communications in information systems (IS). The increased dependency on computer
communications and IS increased the threat of incidents related to information security.
According to the U.S. Information Security Oversight Office, estimated costs associated
with information security were $5.2 billion in 2010 (ISOO, 2015). ISOO reports indicate
that information security continues to be the main driver of all IS costs. Cybercrime
continues to cost billions of dollar to organizations. The importance of this research stems
from this ongoing and well-known issue in IS security research; organizations continue to
lose substantial amounts of money due to failure in securing IS. According to the most
recent US cybercrime survey (Burg et al., 2014), out of the 500 respondents who did
report their losses, the average annual monetary loss was approximately $415,000 for
each organization. A great increase compared to prior years (Peters, 2009). In 2014, three
in four respondents to the US State of cybercrime survey detected a security event in the
past 12 months, and more than a third said the number of security incidents detected
increased over the previous year.

In response, to ensure the security of information systems, researchers and practitioners
have created different secure information system (SIS) design methods. Siponen et al.,
(2006) called for additional research as the review of existing methods indicate the need
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for development of theoretically and empirically grounded SIS design methods. The
existing SIS design methods are theoretically underdeveloped and lacking “serious
research” (Baskerville, 1992) or filled with “nonsense” (Olnes, 1994 p. 628).
Siponen et al., (2006) contended that as the design theory approach has proved successful
in prescribing better design processes for emergent classes of systems, reframing
development of SIS design methods as a design science activity is a promising way to
advance past this problem.

Siponen et al., (2006) defined six meta-design requirements to be met for a secure
information system design. Siponen et al., (2006) asserted that the design of a secure
information system cannot be reduced to technological fixes. Different SIS approaches
cover different levels of IS but the models lack the comprehensiveness needed (Siponen,
2002). The overall aim of this research was to produce a SIS design method that is
theoretically and empirically grounded. In pursuing this aim, this research developed a
design artifact that includes security as a functional requirement in all stages of system
design. The research problem and the research argument is described in Section 1.1.
Importance of investigating the research problem is argued in Section 1.2. The definitions
adopted in this study for the purposes of clarity and consistency of terms are described in
Section 1.3. Literature review of secure IS design is discussed in chapter 2. The design
science research process model is discussed in chapter 3 (Peffers et al., 2008). Action
research and research findings are discussed in chapter 4. Finally, concluding the study in
chapter 5.
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1.2. Research Problem and Argument
Too often, information security is an afterthought in organizations. Organizations spend
time and effort on designing and implementing security solutions for their IS as a
repercussion of implementing the IS itself. However, these efforts are not as effective
since security design aspects were not considered during the initial IS design and due to a
lack of proper understanding of organizational context. The existing SIS design methods,
at least the ones that can be integrated easily into IS or software development process
have a narrow technical focus ignoring organizational aspects (Siponen, 2002; Siponen et
al., 2006).

Other methods that take a socio-technical stance towards the organizational role of IS
security e.g. viable systems (Karyda et al., 2001) suffer from applicability issues. Such
methods cannot be integrated into IS development process. The need for a SIS design
method that provides comprehensive modeling of technical and formal aspects of IS is
being felt and is becoming more evident in literature (Siponen et al., 2006). Despite the
wealth of literature in IS security, emergent SIS design approaches continue to fail in
securing IS in organizations.

Information security design aspects have been ignored in IS development methods. In the
literature, there has been a call for a SIS design method that goes beyond implementation
of technical controls and includes organizational aspects (Siponen, 2002; Siponen et al.,
2006). The research problem investigated in this study is how to design a secure
information system. Current design methods promote the idea that IS security must be
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included in all IS development stages including design stages (D'Aubeterre et al., 2008).
However, such modeling does not consider the context at which the organization operates
under and thus does not provide design comprehensiveness (Siponen et al., 2006). This
research argued that in order to secure the processes of information system in an
organization, it is fundamental to understand the context of organizational processes and
activities. Capturing the context of processes and activities within IS is essential to
understand IS security requirements.

This dissertation contended that in order for secure information system design to be
successful, a proper understanding of the context of the underlying information system
activities and business processes is essential. Information systems security research needs
to mature from mechanistic tendencies and ground itself in contextualism (Tejay, 2008).
When considering the relevance and applicability of a given approach, one should bear in
mind the context of the organization and environment where an approach will be applied.
Using the context of activities to evaluate IS security allows for more control over IS.
Therefore, incorporating the context of activities and processes when defining security
requirements ensures the security of the information system design and helps incorporate
security in all IS design stages.

The challenge for organizations lies in the ability to include IS security design aspects in
the IS development process. This research study extended the existing body of
knowledge in SIS design in three areas. First, this research study addressed a gap in the
existing research by developing a theoretically grounded and comprehensive approach on
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how to design a secure IS that can be integrated into all IS development stages. Second,
this research study investigated how to integrate socio-technical aspects in IS
development stages using the context of processes in IS and organization. Finally, there
has been limited research in examining the dynamics of access control during security
requirement analysis and design stages (D'Aubeterre et al., 2008). This research included
IS security requirements along with access control dynamics in all IS design stages.

1.3. Importance of Research Problem
All SIS design methods come with their own shortcomings. Siponen (2002) outlined the
evolution of SIS design methods in literature in terms of their influencing disciplines: “IS
security, computer security, practitioners, database security, and cryptology”. Siponen
(2002) also extended the generational classification of IS design approaches originally
proposed by Baskerville (1992) to include disciplines of security (see Appendix A).

Early SIS design generations “naturalistic-mechanistic” were mainly advocated by
practitioners and computer science researchers. Such approaches are means oriented,
they are aimed at finding out what can be done, or what should the organization do with
the help of available technical solutions. These design approaches fail to ensure the
security of IS because they only focus on technical aspects of SIS design and do not take
IS security requirements as a point of departure during IS design. Early SIS design
generations failed to provide comprehensive security coverage to all aspects of system
design.
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Later generations were focused on IS modeling aspects. Unlike mechanistic methods, this
generation considers organizational requirements during IS design. However, they focus
heavily on business process modeling and information modeling. The objective in this
approach is to extend security issues into workflow and business process management.
Rohm et al., (1998) and Herrmann & Pernul (1999) suggested a layered framework
according to which the security (mainly confidentiality and integrity) requirements of
business processes can be modeled.

The responsibility modeling approach was first proposed in the third generation (Dobson,
1990) based on the idea that finding and modeling work responsibilities as the key point
of departure for securing system. This idea was later adopted by Backhouse
& Dhillon (1996) and McDermott & Fox (1999) using a socio-technical lens rather than a
modeling approach. Applicability to SIS design is a major concern when it comes to
responsibility modeling since there is no model that explains how responsibilities can be
integrated into IS design process. The viable approach of Hutchinson and Warren (2000)
is incorporated into the third generation domain due to the technical organizational role
attributed to IS security. Limitations of third generation approach are discussed in detail
in literature review section.

The emerging “socio-technical” generation takes the organizational security requirements
as a first step in developing SIS design and does not just replace the organization's unique
information security requirements for a generic list of predefined protection means
suggested by some information security experts. The socio-technical generation
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acknowledges the interaction between people and technology. It highlights
the interrelatedness of social and technical aspects of an organization as a whole.
Securing the technical aspects of an organization cannot be achieved without considering
social aspects of processes. This generation includes soft system approach by James
(1996), responsibility modeling (Dhillon, 1997), and survivable systems (Karyda et al.,
2001).

The responsibility modeling SIS design approach believe that the security requirements
can be modeled by exploring the role responsibilities in organizations Dhillon (1997).
Karyda et al., (2001) argued that instead of focusing on secure IS, research should focus
on viable IS. In other words, a secure system should survive or be survivable in the face
of attacks. The “Orion strategy” proposed by James (1996) stems from Checklands
(1981) soft system methodology. James (1996) was the first to embed user participation
in designing secure IS. The Orion strategy emphasizes participation of people in defining
what needs to be done in terms of managing security in information systems.

Emergent literature focuses on socio-technical approaches to IS design, perhaps the
biggest problem with the existing socio-technical design paradigm is developmental
duality, i.e., they do not provide any guidance as to how their design approaches could be
integrated into the IS development process (Baskerville, 1992). Applicability to
information system and software development (Baskerville, 1992) is needed to explore
whether the secure information system design approach can be integrated into
information systems. The importance of the research problem stemmed from the need to
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have an applicable socio-technical approach for secure IS design that includes security
requirements from both aspects (social and technical).

1.4. Definitions of Terms
Three classes of definitions are required to establish the conceptual boundaries of this
research. For the purposes of this dissertation, definitions of select terms used are
provided.

Information System is defined as an aggregate of information handling activities at a
technical, formal and informal level of an organization (Liebenau & Backhouse, 1990).
This is consistent with Karyda et al., (2001) view of an information system as “a human
activity system comprising five elements, namely hardware, software, data, procedures
and, above all, people…in order to support human activities in the context of an
organization.” (Karyda et al., 2001 p. 454.). The hardware, software, and data comprise
the technical level. Procedures comprise the formal level. The formal level is bounded by
rules used to control organizations. This research proposes to model the context of
procedures, behaviors and human activities and define the context of procedures in terms
of rules in the formal level to control organization. Finally, people or the informal
character of information systems is expressed in people’s assumptions, expectations,
beliefs and informal goals, which comprise the informal level of an information system.

Information System Security has been traditionally defined by computer science
researchers from a technical perspective adopting the CIA triad (Bishop, 2003). This
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definition does not align with the view of IS security adopted in this research. The
organizational role in information security is socio-technical. The definition adopted in
this dissertation considered information systems security as a well-informed sense of
assurance that information risks and controls are in balance (Anderson, 2003). This
definition aligns well with this research as it acknowledges the existence of formal levels
in information systems in terms of organizational control.

Business Process and Business Process Modeling (BPM) have many definitions as
discussed in the literature review. This research followed the definition by D'Aubeterre et
al., (2008a) which views a business process as a set of coordinated activities, enacted by
human or software agents that exchange knowledge resources to achieve business
objectives.

1.5. Summary
This research investigated secure IS design. The research problem was introduced in
chapter 1. Discussion of relevant literature on secure IS design approaches is presented in
chapter 2. The research design and methodology are presented in chapter 3. Action
research is presented in chapter 4. Findings, implications, and limitations of this study are
presented in chapter 5. Conclusions are presented in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
In the first section, the evolution of IS development methodologies in terms of
generations and paradigms is presented (Hirschheim & Klein, 1992). Generations and
paradigms in SIS design are then presented (Siponen, 2002). An explanation for
positioning this research in socio-technical paradigm is then presented. This review
provided a basis for the suggested approach based on organization based access control
(OrBAC) (Kalam et al., 2003) as the kernel theory.

2.2. IS Design Approaches
IS development (ISD) methodologies as portrayed by (Hirschheim & Klein, 1992) are
presented first. Chronologically, there are seven generations of ISD approaches (Formal,
Structured, Prototyping, Sense-making, Trade-union, Emancipatory and Socio-technical)
approaches. These methodologies fall within four paradigms (functionalism, social
relativism, radical structuralism, neo-humanism) based on their ontological and
epistemological assumptions (Hirschheim & Klein, 1992).

2.2.1. Formal life cycle approach (classical)
The earliest of ISD generations was inspired by system development approach in
software engineering. This generation was known as the formal, traditional or classical
approach. The term software engineering started in the early 70’s, which referred to
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well-structured methods and tools for program design, implementation, and testing once
system requirements are given.

Too many projects were failures, the importance of information systems planning for
determination of requirements and priorities of projects was noted in IS management.
Blumenthal (1969) suggested “planned evolution” as a methodology for orderly,
organization-wide IS development based on his experience with systems development. IS
development depended on codified techniques that eventually were formalized into a
“methodology”.

IS are built from the requirements elicited by the system analyst from the users. User
requirements elicitation was considered difficult but not a noncontroversial exercise.
Users provided information is the basis for IS requirements. This rational strategy formed
what is called a “System Development Life Cycle” (SDLC). SDLC is the “classical” ISD
approach which iterates through five general steps (requirements analysis, design,
implementation, testing, and evolution). According to Elliot (2004), SDLC "originated
in the 1960s, to develop large-scale functional business systems in an age of largescale business conglomerates. Information systems activities revolved around heavy data
processing and number crunching routines".

2.2.2. Structured approaches
The formal SDLC approach suffered from major problems that led to the development of
the structured approach (Hirschheim & Klein, 1992). From a system developer
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perspective, the design of the system is almost impossible because of changing user
requirements. From the users’ perspective, it was hard to know in advance what the
implemented system should look like. To address these issues, a more structured
approach was suggested using a “sign off” and the “structured walk through”
(Hirschheim & Klein, 1992).

The sign off allows the system analyst to work to an agreed specification that was signed
off by the users. The structured work through allows the users to have an understanding
of what the finished product would look like as they were formally “walked through” the
details of the system design during formal sessions. IS development was still perceived as
a technical process, although the social consequences were acknowledged and somewhat
considered in the structured walkthrough.

2.2.3. Prototyping approaches
In the late 80’s, the structured and formal approaches became problematic as they slowed
down the design and development of systems. Users could no longer wait for a formal
life cycle to finish, the implemented system would no longer meet the user requirements
after two or three years of development. The idea emerged that users needed to
experience the application software to better understand what the application would look
like. Naumann & Jenkins (1982) and Earl (1978) suggested using a prototyping approach.
A prototype is a scaled-down variant of the final system that exhibits some of its salient
features to allow the users to get a feel of the interface and the computational power.
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2.2.4. Sense-making approaches
One concern behind the structured approaches was problem formulation. Some argued
that it can be easily tackled using a scientific approach to problem-solving (Newell &
Simon, 1972). Checkland (1981) had a different perspective with his soft system
methodology (SSM). Checkland (1981) believed that there must be a richer interpretation
of the “problems of problem formulation”. “Problems” or user requirements are not
easily articulated, it may be misleading to assume that a problem exists rather that one is
constructed between various stakeholders (Hirschheim & Klein, 1992).

Following this approach and as an extension of SSM, “sense making” methodologies
emerged. The argument behind this approach is the need to develop approaches that
would lead to a better mutual understanding between users and developers to avoid
problem formulation. “sense making” can be defined as “the modes in which a group
interacts to interpret their environment and arrive at socially shared meanings” (Klein
and Hirschheim, 1987, p.302). System development in “sense making” is perceived as a
social process. However, the projects that surfaced from sense making approach never
matured into a complete methodology (Klein and Hirschheim, 1987).

2.2.5. Trade Union approaches
In trade union approaches, system development is seen as part art, part science, and part
class politics; it’s conceived as a very much social process rather than a technical one. It
was a reaction to the negative social effects of generation 1 and 2 approaches. The
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approach argues that control of system development should be in the hands of the
workforce rather than management (Kubicek, 1983). Proponents of this approach felt
that a socio-technical approach is a form of deceit to reduced worker resistance to
systems that served mostly the interest of managers and offered little to improve worker
position. A set of projects immersed that introduced a set of general guidelines, tools, and
techniques that would allow the trade union to dictate the system direction (Hirschheim
& Klein, 1992). However, there is not much research on evaluation of this approach.

2.2.6. Emancipatory approaches
An emancipatory approach is merely a conceptual approach supported by the
emancipatory ideals. There are no developed projects that adopted the emancipatory
theme. The emancipatory approach conceives system development as a social process
and sees the need for sense-making (called “mutual understanding” in this approach). The
difference from other approaches is in the orientation towards emancipation through
rational and emancipatory discourse.

The goal of systems development is a system that would not only support emancipatory
discourse but also a mutual understanding of all its users. Hershihem & Klien (1994)
explored the emancipatory principles and discussed how they might be applied in
information systems development. Existing ISD methodologies only partially embrace
emancipatory principles (Hershihem & Klien 1994).
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2.2.7. Socio-technical and participative approaches
System development in this approach is seen as part art and part science. It is viewed
jointly as a social and technical process. The structured and prototyping approaches
progressed the field greatly, but there were few issues identified by IS research (Mumford
(1998); Land & Hirschheim (1983)). IS researchers felt that sign offs and structured
walk-throughs were potentially helpful but were fundamentally misguided in their ability
to elicit true user involvement (Hirschheim & Klein, 1992). System development had
traditionally focused on the technical systems rather than the social systems. This led to
information systems that might have been technically sophisticated but was not ideal
from a social or work standpoint (Hirschheim & Klein, 1992).

The socio-technical approach adopted in this study suggest that interventions should lead
to an improved social as well as technical systems. System development in the sociotechnical approach uses system development as a vehicle to rethink the social work
environment in which the new system would be implemented. According to (Hirschheim
& Klein, 1992) all socio-technical approaches should focus on having the users not only
be involved in systems development but take control of the process; and having systems
development to be used to redesign the work situation leading to an improve social and
technical system.
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2.3. Business Process and Business Process Realization
D'Aubeterre et al., (2008) argued that SIS design must incorporate security as a
functional requirement in the early stages of requirement specification and analysis of IS.
To do so, there must be an understanding of how business processes are coordinated to
achieve their objective. This allows eliciting security requirements from the context of
business processes. A business process is a set of coordinated activities, enacted by
human or software agents that exchange knowledge resources to achieve business
objectives (D'Aubeterre et al., 2008). An organization’s business processes comprise
value activities that create customer value (Porter & Millar, 1985). These activities must
be coordinated to achieve the business goals effectively. Business processes require
coordination mechanisms to manage the interdependencies of their constituent activities
(Malone, 1987).

The security of knowledge resources must be ensured. Information and knowledge
resources sharing may lead to possible unauthorized access and usage which in turn
would cause loss of assets. An organization may incur significant costs without
appropriate and timely authorization access to information resources when performing
business activities (D'Aubeterre et al., 2008).

From an IS perspective, IS researchers are moving away from the security technical
viewpoint toward a socio-organizational perspective (D'Aubeterre et al., 2008). This
movement may lead to more holistic IS security research where organizational security
aspects are incorporated in the design and development of SIS. Hence, capturing the
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business process context will allow integrating security in the design and development of
SIS.

2.4. SIS Design Approaches
Secure IS design was inspired by many disciplines including IS development and
computer science approaches. Baskerville (1992) provided an overview of conventional
SIS design approaches (normative standards, risk management, formal methods, and
common sense principles). More recently, Siponen (2002) conducted an analysis of
contemporary SIS design approaches (see Appendix A.). Some of these methods either
lack serious research or suffer from development duality. These methods cannot be easily
integrated to IS development process (Siponen, 2002).

2.4.1. Traditional SIS design (First and Second generations)
The first and second generation (Naturalistic-Mechanistic) of SIS design were focused on
what can be done as opposed to what needs to be done from a technical point of view.
This generation was described in Baskerville (1992) which included normative standards,
risk management, formal methods, and common sense principles. Normative standards
referred to checklists, management and maturity standards. The idea behind checklists is
to write down what are the possible security solutions that can be identified and turn it
into a list.

Risk Management (RM) can be described as an interpretive means-oriented technical
communication tool to help manager understand risks. Formal methods suggest that IS or
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software development should be carried out by formal methods. These formal methods
are supported by the use of logic and mathematical modeling. However, both RM and
formal methods suffer from development duality. Common sense principles are
developed on the basis of practical experience and neglecting related work.

2.4.2. Contemporary SIS design (Third and Fourth generations)
Modern SIS design approaches consist of the third generation (IS modeling approaches)
and the fourth generation (socio-technical approaches) (see Appendix A.). Siponen
organized contemporary SIS design approaches based on an analytical framework of
research objective, organizational role of IS security, research approach, applicability,
and the meta-model for IS design process. In consensus with Baskerville (1992), Dhillon
& Backhouse (2001) and D'Aubeterre et al., (2008), Siponen (2002) believes that the
organizational role of IS security (see Table 1) should be socio-technical.

Researchers call for alternative SIS design approaches that embrace the social and sociotechnical view. Third generational approaches focused on IS modeling, and fourth
generational methods emphasize socio-technical design. This explains why contemporary
approaches are classified under two different generations, as they differ in their
underlying assumption of the organizational role of IS security. Virtual methodology
(Hitchings, 1996) and the Orion strategy (James, 1996) are aligned within the fourth
generation (socio-technical) while other approaches are aligned within the third
generation (IS modeling).
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Table 1. An Overview of Contemporary SIS design approaches (adopted from Siponen (2002))

The Information modeling approach is considered in the “IS modeling” generation. This
approach is motivated by the desire to build security notations (Hirshheim et al., 1995),
specifically for developing secure databases. The organizational role of IS security is
purely technical. However, this approach is hard to integrate into IS development since
this approach adopts a low-level (technical) database development oriented view
(Siponen, 2002).

The security modeling and business process approach was suggested by a group of
German researchers (Röhm et al., 1998). They suggest a framework where confidentiality
and integrity requirements of a business process can be modeled. The framework
consists of a three-layered architecture for business process security. In the third layer,
the high-level security requirements of business processes are graphically analyzed. In
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the second layer, these are translated into more a formal, intermediate language, and the
security elements are identified and divided into security blocks. This framework is
mainly concerned with layer three. The third layer provides five perspectives.

The perspectives are informational, functional, dynamic, organizational and business
process perspective. The perspectives are created using entity relationship diagrams, state
transition diagrams, and data flow diagrams to model information and business aspects
(Pernul et al., (1992); Hermman & Permul (1999)). They argued that information
modeling is needed to communicate the security requirements between the different
people involved in the development in question (Herrman & Pernul 1998 p. 766). While
this approach may succumb the problems of development duality. Researchers did not
explain how this approach can be integrated into IS development. In addition, the focus is
on technical systems so the organizational role of IS security is purely technical. This, in
turn, ignores socio-technical and participative aspects of IS design. While dissemination
of information is discussed in the design paradigm, eliciting security requirements from
stakeholders is not addressed.

The responsibility modeling approach argued that security requirements are found by
understanding the role responsibilities in organizations. Backhouse & Dhillon (1996) and
(Dhillon, 1997) among other researchers (McDermott & Fox, 1999) argued for using
responsibility as a basis for IS security development. A major problem with this approach
is development duality with the exception of McDermott & Fox (1999) which is clearly
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applicable to IS development approach. McDemott & Fox (1999) view varies from
technical to socio-technical in terms of the organizational role of IS security.

Viable and survivable system approaches (Hutchinson & Warren (2000); Karyda et al.,
(2001)) are theoretically grounded on Beers viable system model (Beer, 1984). The
model consists of five systematic functions, which need to be performed in order for an
organization to be viable (or survivable). These systematic functions are:
1- System One: the ‘operational elements’ that produce the system and interact with
the external environment. These elements are themselves viable systems.
2- System Two: the ‘co-ordination’ functions that ensure that the operational
elements work harmoniously.
3- System Three: the ‘control’ activities, which maintain and allocate resources to
the operational elements.
4- System Four: the ‘intelligence’ functions that consider the system as a whole -its
strategic opportunities, threats, and future direction. They also interface with the
environment.
5- System Five: the ‘identity’ function, which identifies self-awareness in the
system.

However, the SIS design approach taken by Krayda et al., (2001) is quite radical; shifting
focus from secure system to what is called viable or survivable IS. “We propose a new
framework for building secure information systems, or as we suggest them to be called,
viable information systems” (Karyda et al., 2001 p. 453). The organization role of IS
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security is socio-technical. Albeit, Karyda et al., (2001) does not explain how this
approach can be applied to IS design process, it is a possible venue for research."securitymodified IS development approach" was used to describe approaches that are influenced
by IS or software development methods.

The theoretical lens varies in these approaches as they belong to different generations.
Approaches from the third generation (IS modeling) are logical modeling (Baskerville,
1989), Spiral approach (Booysen & Eloff, 1995) and IS security planning methodology
(Straub & Welke, 1998). Approaches from the fourth generation (socio-technical) include
the Orion strategy approach proposed by James (1996), and virtual Methodology
approach proposed by Hitchings (1995).

Focusing on what needs to be done and using a security modified IS development
approach, two SIS development approaches can be integrated into IS development
process (James, 1996; Hitching, 1995). James (1996) introduced Orion strategy, which
suggests that security problems and potential problem situations existing within business
organizations should be in effect, handed back to the people who use, and are responsible
for, those systems (James, 1996). James (1996) was perhaps the first to embed user
participation in the designing secure IS. James (1996) was closer to the social view on the
organizational role of IS security following Checklands (1981) soft system methodology.

This research took a similar approach to James (1996) and Hitchings (1995) by
considering the socio-technical role but with a few minor differences. However, the
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focus is on eliciting requirements in terms of business process contexts and capturing
security requirements. This allows minimizing user involvement unlike James (1996)
which is considered to be more radical towards the social view. The novelty in the
approach in this study is that it described how contextual, emergent and changing
requirements can be incorporated into the design of IS meeting all meta-design
requirements as defined by Siponen et al., (2006). The approach explained not only what
needs to be done, but also how it can be done.

2.5. Summary
Literature review on the evolution of secure information system has been provided since
70’s following Baskerville (1999) and Siponen (2002). Design approaches have matured
to meet the need for modern information systems. Based on the review, there seems to be
a consensus that the role of IS security must be socio-technical. Secure information
system design with socio-technical aspects in mind is the goal of this study. The
conceptual modeling of context has been used in different areas of research (Myers,
1997) e.g. modeling reasoning and expert systems (Brézillon, 2015). Context graphs have
also been used in modeling tasks and practices (Dichev, 2001). The use of context graphs
has also been suggested to model experiences Batarseh et al., (2013).

(Batars eh, Gonzalez, & Knauf, 2013)
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Chapter 3
Research Design and Methodology
3.1. Introduction
This research followed design science research paradigm in IS to develop a method for
SIS design (March & Smith, 1995). A distinction between design science and design
science research is made here. Design science is research into or about design; and design
science research, which this research follows, is research using design as a research
method or technique (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004). A brief introduction to design
science and design science research in IS is presented first. Design science research
methodology process model (Perffers et al., 2007) is then followed.

Design science research is motivated by the need to improve the environment by
introducing new creative and innovative artifacts (Simon, 1996). The design science
paradigm originated from engineering and sciences of the artificial (Simon, 1996).
Design science in IS research creates and evaluates information technology artifacts
intended to solve identified organizational problems. The artifacts should demonstrate a
contribution to knowledge (Gregor & Hevner, 2013).

The application domain for design science includes people, organizations, and technical
systems (Hevner, 2007). The result of design science research in IS is a purposeful
information technology artifact created to address an important organizational problem.
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The artifact must be described effectively, enabling its implementation and application in
an appropriate domain (Hevner et al., 2004).

Design science research involves the creation of new knowledge through design of novel
or innovative artifact and analysis of the use and/or performance of such artifact along
with reflection and abstraction to improve and understand the behavior of aspects of
information systems (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004). Design science research in IS is
conducted within design processes and produces four types of design artifacts (March &
Smith, 1995). The artifacts could be methods, models, constructs, and instantiations. The
artifacts are designed to address unsolved problems. They are evaluated with respect to
the utility provided in solving those problems (Hevner et al., 2004). The overall design
science research process model includes six steps: problem identification and motivation,
definition of the objectives for a solution, design and development, demonstration,
evaluation, and communication (Peffers et al., 2007). These steps are discussed in the
next subsections.

3.2. Problem Identification and Motivation
Hevner et al., (2004) argued that IS research is conducted in two complementary
balanced phases, a behavioral science paradigm and a design science paradigm. The goal
of the behavioral paradigm is to provide Truth (justified theory or true statements
corresponding with real world phenomena) while the design science paradigm is focused
on Utility (building artifacts that are effective).
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The behavioral science research paradigm develops theories and justifications to explain
or predict a phenomenon related to business needs. The driving business need in this
study is securing IS from starting with early design stages. Practitioners who are
managing, designing and implementing IS fail to secure the business interactions and
operation of people within organizations and information technology. Following the
design science research paradigm, this research built and evaluated an artifact designed to
meet this driving business need and provided applicable knowledge to secure business
processes.

3.3. Definition of the Objectives for a Solution
The objective was to provide a secure information system design that meets well-defined
criteria (Siponen et al., 2006). The solution was presented as an artifact using design
science. Design science artifacts in IS are theoretically grounded on a design theory or
“kernel” theory (Markus et al., 2002). Design theories are prescriptive theories, based on
scientific theory, technical information, and imagination that explain how the process of
designing an information system can be feasibly and effectively carried out for a
particular set of requirements (Walls et al., 1992). Design theories are considered as
practical knowledge used to support design activities (Goldkuhl, 2004). This research
introduced a nascent design theory as per (Gregor & Hevner, 2013) to address the
identified problem discussed in the previous section.

A secure design must capture socio-technical aspects of IS, it must also understand the
context of organizational processes and activities. These contexts are captured in the
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suggested artifact using Organization Based Access Control (OrBAC) context model
(Cuppens & Miège, 2003). The next section contrasts Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) in IS with OrBAC and describes how OrBAC is used in the design artifact.

Confidentiality is often enforced using a form of authorization known as access control.
Many theoretical access control models exist. The discretionary access control did not
adopt well to IS in organizations (Ferraiolo et al., 1995). The introduction of databases
required users to own information to run their operations and activities. The security of
business processes in organizations became a burden. The role-based access control
(RBAC) access control model (see Figure 1) was one of the early models that introduced
the concept of “Role” (Ferraiolo et al., 1995). The design of RBAC states that a user can
fulfill a role, and therefore that user can own the information related to that role. The
security design aspect of IS relies predominantly upon security specialists towards
building a dedicated group of IS roles using technical methods. Security specialist will
create user roles (system wide access control LDAP in windows) and\or application
specific roles (payroll system within organizational IS).

RBAC strictly focuses on roles. The roles are statically defined by the experts (e.g. user,
admin) and do not follow organizational roles and context. During IS design stages,
these roles are what define security controls that need to be placed in terms of
authorizations and not requirements as defined by IS users.
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Figure 1. Basic RBAC as in NIST Standard 359-2004

There are limitations when adopting RBAC in terms of access control methodology in IS
design. These limitations are listed along with limitations found in (Kalam et al., 2003)
that inhibit dynamic access control in Table 2. These RBAC limitations are contributing
to SIS failure in capturing the nature of processes in IS, which in turn creates room for
vulnerable IS. Control of IS access must consider the custom nature of organizations and
clear the confusion between actions and roles.
Table 2. RBAC Limitations in IS
No.
1

RBAC Limitation
The concept of permission is primitive. When specifying the
security policy of a given application, the RBAC model
must be refined to make explicit the structure of
permissions.

2

The concept of role hierarchy is not free of ambiguity. In
particular, it is generally incorrect to consider that it
corresponds to an organizational hierarchy.

3

The ability to specify a permission that depends on a given
context. More precisely, if a given permission is granted to a
given role, then all users that play this role will inherit the
given permission.

4

RBAC only enables the administrator to specify
permissions.

5

Additional limits appear when the RBAC model is used to
specify the security policy of a system that includes several
organizations.

6

RBAC does not incorporate the content and context of the
information workflow and does not separate task (action)
from role.
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The existing SIS design methods merely define general strategies and principle functions
for IS design and do not explicitly state how these strategies can be integrated into IS
development as previously mentioned. They also do not explain the dynamics of access
control in such IS. The objective of this research was to create a design method that
would fully explain the security design aspects in all SIS development stages, from
requirement analysis to design and implementation stages.

Surely enough the design theory behind the proposed SIS design approach requires both,
a unique type of IT solution (IT product design) and a unique design strategy (IS
development approach) to satisfy unique “meta-requirements” (Markus et al., 2002).
Notably, meta-requirements for SIS design have been proposed by Siponen et al., (2006).
In the next section, the artifact that incorporates context from an IS perspective into SIS
design model is presented. Meta-notations to represent analyzed security requirements in
the design of IS are presented.

3.4. Design and Development
OrBAC constructs are considered when defining secure IS requirements in the proposed
design method. The OrBAC model was originally proposed in the literature as an
alternative to existing access control models to specifically address the problem of
specifying contextualized and emergent technical security rules (Kalam et al., 2003).
Unlike other access control models, OrBAC can apply rules that specify contextual
permissions for specific circumstances. An example would be an IT technician gaining
administrator privileges to a core service to introduce a hotfix when the actual
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administrator is not available. Alternatively, in health care, a physician having special
permissions in the context of urgency. In addition, from a control perspective, the OrBAC
model can specify granular authorization including prohibitions, obligations, and
recommendations; unlike classical access control models which are only restricted to
permissions.

Cuppens and Miege (2003) define an organization as an organized group of active
entities, i.e. subjects, playing some role or other. A subject plays a role in the
organization corresponding to some agreement between the subjects to form an
organization. Kalam et al., (2003) used organizations as an abstraction layer between
subjects and roles, objects, and views, action, and activities. The definition of the context
also depends on the organization. Contexts are used to specify the concrete circumstances
for organizations and are only defined by concrete entities. The entities, organization,
subject, object, action, and context are linked together by the relationship Define (see
Appendix C).

OrBAC is a contextualized access control method that addresses the limitations of
RBAC. Conceptualizing access control in processes using OrBAC provides the
comprehensiveness required and adaptation to IS security requirements. Adoption of
context from the OrBAC model allows modeling the complexity of socio-technical IS or
the human activity system. OrBAC constructs are considered when defining secure IS
requirements in the design method. The objective of OrBAC is to specify the access

31
control policy at the organizational level that is independent (abstract) of the
implementation of this policy.
The abstract level deﬁnes the concepts of organization, role, activity, view, context and
security rules to express the abstract policy. The abstract policy, speciﬁed at the
organizational level, is speciﬁed-using roles, activities, and views, which respectively
abstract the concrete subject, actions, and objects. The role of a subject is simply called a
role as in the RBAC model.

The organization employs a subject so it defines that role. On the other hand, an action is
an abstraction of activity. Different organizations may consider activities to belong to
different actions. The abstraction of an object is called a view. A view is an
organizational concept used to structure the policy specification for using objects, i.e. a
view groups objects on which the same security rules apply.

In OrBAC, one can define that a subject may have the permission, prohibition or
obligation to do an activity on some object given an associated context is true (see Figure
2). The formalism of the OrBAC model uses first-order logic notations which allow each
organization to specify its own security rules. These security rules are represented using
an array of first order predicates. Notations and constructs from the OrBAC model are
adopted in the design method. Even though OrBAC constructs are adopted, the unique
contribution of this work is an artifact that describes how an IS can be securely designed
using these simple constructs:
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Organizations (org): a central entity of OrBAC may represent multiple
organizations or an organized group of subjects.



Subjects (s): person, actor, entity or an automated agent.

Figure 2. OrBAC model (El Kalam et al., 2003)



Actions (a): means for subjects to access objects.



Objects (o): static entities e.g. files, records.



Roles (r): a set of subjects to which the same security rule applies.



Activities (alpha): a set of actions to which the same security rule applies.



Views (v): a set of objects to which the same security rule applies.



Contexts (c): a condition in which rules only apply when the condition is true
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The context concept has been introduced in the OrBAC model in order to express
dynamic rules (Cuppens & Miège, 2003). Contexts correspond to any constraint that joins
a subject, an action, and an object. Contexts may be temporal, spatial, user-declared,
prerequisite or provisional. Cuppens & Miege (2003) defined the following contexts:


Temporal (depends on the time at which the subject is requesting an access to the
system)



Spatial (depends on the subject location)



User-declared (depends on the subject objective)



Prerequisite (depends on characteristics that join the subject, the action, and the
object)



Provisional (depends on previous actions the subject has performed in the system).

The CSIS artifact suggests adopting context from the OrBAC model using a sociotechnical lens to incorporate security during requirement analysis phase to ensure secure
business processes. A business process context is defined from people’s point of view. In
the CSIS artifact, context must be with the same level of abstraction as the organization.
Contexts must validate roles, activities, and views. This way the required level of
abstraction from explicit implementations of actions can be provided as actions are
separate from roles.

As with current literature, this research ontology on security is described as a functional
requirement in the analysis and modeling of business processes. This helps achieve the
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research goal in incorporating security analysis and design into the overall IS analysis
and design methodology. The conceptualization used in the CSIS artifact is consistent
with OrBAC access control model from an IS point of view.
OrBAC constructs are used to define security IS requirements in the suggested design
method. The nascent design theory (Gregor & Hevner, 2013) in this conceptualization is
that the underlying process activity implementation i.e. interaction between subjects,
objects and actions is completely abstracted. This allows the method schematic to be
drawn in an abstract, holistic and systematic manner. The following rules represent the
modeling concepts for secure business processes during requirement analysis.



Organizations define the abstract Roles, Activities, and Views:
o A subject fulfills an organizational role. Organizational roles are fulfilled
by subjects.
o An activity is considered a set of actions; actions are a simple operation
that collectively represents an activity.
o A view uses a set of objects. objects are used by a view.



A role may have the permission, prohibition, recommendation or obligation to do
an activity coordinated on some view if and only if the given context is true.

Using these rules, an artifact to describe how an IS can be designed with security in mind
can be deduced. This artifact is considered a design artifact for Contextual SIS (CSIS)
design (see Figure 3). The artifact presented in Figure 3 will allow IS practitioners to
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embed IS security requirements in all IS design and development stages, from
requirement analysis, design and through the implementation of IS.

Figure 3. CSIS Design Artifact

An organization aims to achieve a business objective and defines a set of general roles to
achieve these objectives. An agent assigned by the organization fulfills these roles. The
agent is restricted by the activities allocated to that role. These activities are the business
processes required to achieve the business objective. Each activity is restricted by
specific actions and the views allocated to them.
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The view is specific to certain objects and is only granted based on the allocated activity.
IS practitioners are responsible for defining these allocations based on business and IS
requirements. These requirements are also used to extract the business process context.
The defined context is used to check whether the role is obligated, prohibited, obligated
or recommended to perform the given activity on the given view.

The changing and shifting organizational requirements can be accounted for using
organizational context (Siponen et al., 2006). The developed artifact uses an activity
context as a core control to IS security. After the implementation of the IS, contexts can
be tweaked to account for those changes. A change in the nature of activity conducted in
IS reflects back to the context that validates the activity to ensure the security of said
activity and view.

The artifact can be driven to later stages. Requirements analysis stage can define the
organizational roles, views, and activities. The context of these activities can be defined
during design stages. The actual entities subjects, objects, and actions are later defined
during the implementation of IS. However, a strict review process on context change
must be done by security experts to ensure the emergent contexts based on business needs
do not affect the state of information security assurance in IS.

Using context, different sets of high-level activities and scenarios can be accounted. IS
resources (objects) should only be available to agents (subjects) when the agent's
associated action falls under his/her role and that role is known to have activities that
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require viewing these resources (objects). This form of control allows for much more
agility in terms of adaptation to requirements based on organization needs and at the
same time be able to easily find access anomalies based on context nature.

Situation awareness theory (Endsley, 1995) is used to measure IS practitioners awareness
of security policies, regulations, and constraints generated by the CSIS artifact.
Endsly (1995) defines situation awareness as “the ability to perceive the status, attributes,
and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment”. Situation awareness is
the perception of environmental elements with respect to time or space, the
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status after some variable has
changed, such as time, or some other variable, such as a predetermined event. It involves
being aware of what is happening in the vicinity, in order to understand how information,
events, and one’s own actions will affect goals and objectives.

D'Aubeterre et al., (2008) extended situation awareness theory to define security
awareness, which “assess the comprehension of security policies and constraints in the
analysis of security requirements”. The utility of the CSIS artifact is assessed by
assessing the security awareness generated by the CSIS artifact against the best known
SIS design methods, namely, secure activity resource coordination (SARC)
conceptualization of secure business process (D'Aubeterre et al., 2008), security enriched
use cases (Siponen et al., 2006) in capturing the security requirements and security
aspects of IS. The research model to test security awareness generated by these SIS
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design methods is presented in Figure 4. Hypotheses are discussed in the next
subsection.

It is evident that the CSIS artifact should be informationally equivalent (Larkin & Simon,
1987) to other SIS design methods. CSIS must ensure that it completely captured IS and
business process requirements with no information loss. This describes the first research
hypothesis.

Figure 4. SIS Design Method Research Model to Test Security Awareness

H1: SIS design developed using CSIS artifact is informationally equivalent to SIS design
developed using security enriched use cases or SARC.

CSIS artifact enabled the use of multiple contexts e.g. temporal, spatial, etc., the design
of IS will be context-aware (Abowd et al., 1999). CSIS artifact must generate higher
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security awareness of security requirements of IS than other SIS design methods. IS
practitioners and security experts should develop a higher level of security awareness
when using CSIS as opposed to other SIS design methods.

H2: SIS design developed using CSIS artifact will generate higher security awareness
than SIS developed using security enriched use cases or SARC.

The individuals’ characteristics influence the perception and interpretation of reality
(D’Aubeterre et al., 2008). These characteristics influence the user’s comfort with
reading diagrams (Allen & March, 2006). This research tested if users with experience in
IS analysis and security would develop a higher level of security awareness using CSIS
than individuals without experience.

H3: SIS design developed using CSIS artifact will generate higher security awareness
than SIS developed using security enriched use cases or SARC for experienced IS
practitioners and security experts.

The next section demonstrates how the CSIS design artifact can be used in the design of
SIS. The demonstration provides evidence for supporting the first hypothesis. A use case
scenario is described in the following section.
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3.5. Demonstration
The artifact must show evidence that it is useful. During demonstration stage, the artifact
is used to solve one or more instances of the problem using knowledge of how to use the
artifact to solve the problem (Peffers et al., 2007). The utility of the CSIS design artifact
is in providing awareness and knowledge about functional security requirements to
business analysts in order to systematically translate complex business processes into a
secure design. Here, a demonstrative example is provided in Table 3. In the next section,
field-testing and rigorous evaluation in the application domain is discussed. The example
is adopted from IS literature (Jaaksi, 1998; Siponen, 2002).

Table 3. Booking Use Case (Jaaksi, 1998; Siponen, 2002)
Use Case:

Booking

Version:
Functional
Summary:

1.0
Preconditions: Booking and customer databases exist.
Exceptions: If information on certain journey is not
available an appropriate error message is produced
Several times a day

Frequency:
Usability
requirements:

A booking clerk books journeys for customers.
Any database query and booking must be able to
complete in less than 30 seconds

Actor:

A clerk

The following are the conceptual modeling rules:


Booking organization defines the abstract Booking Roles, Activities and Views:
o A booking agent fulfills a booking role. Agents fulfill booking roles.
o A booking activity is considered a set of booking database queries;
booking database queries are considered booking activities.
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o A booking view uses a set of databases, booking, and customers. Booking
and customers databases are used by the booking view.


Any booking agent fulfilling the booking role may have the permission,
prohibition, recommendation or obligation to run booking activities coordinated
on booking view if and only if the given booking process context is true. A
booking agent (see Figure 5) who fulfills the booking role books journeys for
customers, several times a day. A temporal context may validate a period where
the agent is requesting access to the system. A spatial context may validate
whether the agent is at the booking agency during the process. Other contexts can
be user declared based on the Booking Co. organization needs Figure 5.

Figure 5. Booking Co. Secure Business Process Realization
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The demonstrative scenario shows evidence for supporting the first research hypothesis.
The resulting artifact encapsulates information captured in a use case scenario. SIS
design developed using CSIS artifact is informationally equivalent to SIS design
developed using security enriched use cases.

3.6. Evaluation
During evaluation stage, artifact support to solving the problem is observed and
measured. In addition, the evaluation stage must determine whether the artifacts meets
validity criteria. Evaluation involves comparing the objectives of a solution to actual
observed results from use of the artifact in the demonstration (Peffers et al., 2007).
Qualitative action research is used to ensure the artifacts rigor. At the end of evaluation
stage, it must be decided whether to iterate back to design to try to improve the
effectiveness of the artifact or to continue on to communication and leave further
improvement to subsequent projects.

The initial relevance cycle defines acceptance criteria for the ultimate evaluation of the
research results. The output must be returned to the environment for study and evaluation
in the application domain. A design artifact must be evaluated to demonstrate its validity,
utility, quality, and efficacy (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). Validity means that the artifact
works and does what it is meant to do; and, is dependable in operational terms in
achieving its goals. The utility criteria assess whether the achievement of goals has value
outside the development environment (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). Because design is
inherently an iterative and incremental activity, the evaluation phase provides essential
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feedback to the construction phase as to the quality of the design process and the design
product under development (Hevner et al., 2004).

Hevner et al., (2004) suggested that the nature of the problem, characteristics of the
artifact, and available resources should drive the selection of the evaluation method. The
goal of evaluation is to establish that the design artifact fulfills the requirements and
constraints of the problem domain and therefore it is complete and effective. A rigorous
design evaluation may draw from many potential techniques, such as analytics, case
studies, experiments, or simulations (Hevner et al., 2004). A summary of possible
evaluation methods and their applicability to the CSIS design artifact is listed in Table 4.

An observational case study and field study are viable evaluation methods for the CSIS
artifact. Observing the use of the artifact allows the researcher to validate if the artifact
achieved its goal of securing the organizational business process in IS design successfully
and in an efficient manner. Such validation can be conducted if the design artifact can be
studied in a controlled experiment to study if the secure design is operational and usable.
However, simulation with artificial data may not be sufficient for evaluating the artifact
based on its socio-technical nature.

Analytical evaluation methods such as static analysis and dynamic analysis may not be
suitable for evaluating the artifact. The design artifact is, in essence, a design method
based on knowledge as operational principles (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). Static and
dynamic qualities would not validate what the artifact is supposed to achieve. With
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sociotechnical artifacts in IS, the design is complex in terms of the size of the artifact and
the number of components (social and technical).

Table 4. Design Evaluation Methods Applicability
Type

Technique

Observational

Case Study

Analytical

Field Study
Static Analysis
Architecture Analysis
Optimization
Dynamic Analysis

Experimental

Testing

Descriptive

Controlled Experiment
Simulation
Functional (Black
Box) Testing
Structural (White Box)
Testing
Informed Argument

Scenarios

Description
Study artifact in depth in business environment

Applicable to
study?
√

Monitor use of artifact in multiple projects
Examine structure of artifact for static qualities (e.g.,
complexity)
Study fit of artifact into technical IS architecture
Demonstrate inherent optimal properties of artifact
or provide optimality bounds on artifact behavior
Study artifact in use for dynamic qualities (e.g.,
performance)
Study artifact in controlled environment for qualities
(e.g., usability)
Execute artifact with artificial data
Execute artifact interfaces to discover failures and
identify defects
Perform coverage testing of some metric (e.g.,
execution paths) in the artifact implementation
Use information from the knowledge base (e.g.,
relevant research) to build a convincing argument
for the artifacts utility
Construct detailed scenarios around the artifact to
demonstrate its utility

√
X
X
X
X
√
X
X
X
√
√

Architecture analysis has been developed for the kernel theory behind the artifact.
However, architectural analysis may not be sufficient for the artifact based on its sociotechnical nature. Black and white box testing may not be sufficient for the same reasons.
Focus groups have gained increased attention in the IS field as a research method
(Torkzadeh et al., 2006; Smith, 1996). Also, the software engineering discipline has
suggested the use of focus groups as an evaluation technique (Kontio et al., 2004; Rouge
& Niederman, 2006).

A focus group is defined as a moderated discussion among six to twelve people who
discuss a topic under the direction of a moderator whose role is to promote interaction
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and keep the discussion on the topic of interest (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2014). The term
focus refers to the fact that the interview is limited to a small number of issues. The
questions in a focus group are open-ended but are carefully predetermined. The set of
questions or questioning route is meant to feel spontaneous but is carefully planned.
Usually, the moderator encourages the sharing of ideas and careful attention is paid to
understanding the feelings, comments, and thought processes of the participants as they
discuss issues (Krueger & Casey, 2014). A typical focus group lasts about two hours and
covers a predetermined range of topics. Multiple focus groups allow for understanding
the range of opinions of people across several groups and provide a much more natural
environment than personal interviews because people are allowed to interact, which
allows them to both influences and be influenced by others (Krueger & Casey, 2014).

A form of use case scenario has been applied during demonstration stage. Classical
evaluation techniques do not seem suitable due to the socio-technical nature of our design
artifact. A suitable way of evaluating the artifacts is “go into the world and try them out”
(Baskerville, 1997). An action research (AR) environment has been made available to the
researcher. Action research provides a way to improve the practical relevance of IS
research and not just theoretical aspects. This research focused on the use of action
research for artifact evaluation as explained in the next section.

3.6.1. Artifact Evaluation using Action Research
The contribution of the secure IS design artifact lies in its utility in the organization
where its applied. In the CSIS artifact, utility lies in the artifact relevance to IS
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development. This research contended that current secure information system design
methods suffer from applicability issues to IS development and software development
methodologies. Action research aims to solve current practical problems while
expanding scientific knowledge (Baskerville & Myers, 2004).

It has been described as “the touchstone of most good organizational development
practice” and “remains the primary methodology for the practice of organizational
development” (Baskerville & Myers, 2004). Therefore, action research may be helpful in
determining whether the CSIS design artifact is applicable for good organizational
development practice. It is in the context of the rigor versus relevance dilemma that
action research holds particular appeal (Mårtensson & Lee, 2004).

Action research is a qualitative research method used in social sciences (Myers, 1997).
Baskerville describes action research as an “interventionist approach to the acquisition of
scientific knowledge that has sound foundations in the post-positivist tradition”
(Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1996). It was proposed for studying human groups and
dynamics from the perspective of bringing about change in society. Unlike natural
sciences e.g. physics and mathematics, social sciences suffer from replicability issues
since social phenomena is not homogeneous through time (Peter Checkland & Holwell,
1998). Action research was introduced to address difficulties faced by social scientists
who would like to make use of the outstanding successful method of inquiry developed in
the natural sciences (Peter Checkland & Holwell, 1998).
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Action research avoids the limitations of studying complex real social events in a
laboratory by engaging the researcher himself or herself in a human situation and
following it along whatever path it takes as it unfolds through time in a real environment.
This means that the only object of research becomes the change process itself. There has
been increased attention on the use of action research as research method in information
system research (Peter Checkland & Holwell, 1998). The information system field is
becoming more concerned with the social aspects of introduction of technology into the
human workplace, rather than focusing solely on the technical aspects (Siponen, 2002).

Action research allows the researcher to intervene the practitioner environment and
introduce change in systems development methodologies. This makes action research an
ideal method to evaluate the utility of the CSIS design artifact. It is not possible to study a
newly invented technique without intervening in some way to inject the new technique
into the practitioner environment, “go into the world and try them out” (Baskerville,
1997). Also, the obtained knowledge about secure information system design can be
directly applied in an organizational environment based on clear conceptual work linking
theory, practice and research objectives (Susman, 1983). Evaluating IS research using
action research is described in the following section.

Action research might intervene to introduce enhancements by means of change. Changes
must have theoretical implications outside the organizational environment. Theory
building takes an incremental and cyclic form. The kernel theory in the design artifact
was utilized (Markus et al., 2002). The secure information system design method is based
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on organization based access control (OrBAC) (Kalam et al., 2003) as the kernel theory.
This research drew modeling concepts from contexts described in OrBAC. Research in
an organization on how to introduce a secure information system design evolved into
research on what organizational changes are first needed to make it possible to introduce
a secure information system design.
In order to achieve scientific rigor using action research, this research followed action
research phases described in Baskerville (1999) which includes diagnosing, action
planning, action taking, evaluating and specifying learning (see Figure 6) in an iterative
manner.

Figure 6. The Action Research Cycle (Baskerville, 1999)

The Client-System infrastructure is the specification of the research environment. It
describes the client and the researcher responsibilities to each other. Working closely
with IS practitioners involved in the study provides key insights on the phenomena under
study (Baskerville, 1999).
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The five action research phases constitute the research environment under which the
researcher and practitioner take specific actions. (Baskerville, 1999) defines these phases
as follows:
1. Diagnosis involves identifying the primary, complex organizational problems that
organizations want to change in a holistic manner. In this phase, the researcher
develops certain theoretical assumptions about the nature of the organization and
the problem domain.
2.

Action Planning goal is to identify organizational actions that would relieve or
improve primary problems. The plan establishes the target for change and the
approach to change. Action planning involves collaboration between researcher
and practitioner to specify actions to improve or correct the problems identified in
the diagnosing phase.

3.

Action Taking implements the planned action. Action taking is a collaborative,
dynamic phase. IS practitioners and researchers work together causing certain
changes. The intervention might be directive, in which the research “directs” the
change, or non-directive, in which the change is sought indirectly. Intervention
tactics can also be adopted can include direct modification of process or
procedures, indirect hiring of experts, or other intervention strategies.

4. Evaluating occurs once the planned actions are completed. Evaluation includes
determining whether the theoretical effects of the action were realized and
whether these effects relieved the problems. The evaluation must critically
question whether the action undertaken where the change was successful was the
sole cause of success. If the change was of no success, researcher cycles through
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another iteration after adjusting hypotheses or design approach. The researcher
and practitioner determine if the problems were corrected and if the theoretical
effects of the actions were realized.
5. In the specifying learning stage, results of research are directed to three audiences.
The organization will adjust norms to reflect the newly gained knowledge in SIS
design. If planned action was unsuccessful, additional knowledge provides
foundations for diagnosing in preparation for researchers to conduct further
research interventions. Whether the theoretical framework was successful or not,
important knowledge would be gained from the scientific community with future
research settings. In the diagnosis phase, this research attempted to pinpoint core
problems that cause the information system to be insecure and understand the
reasoning behind the organization's desire for a change of its’ IS design. The
diagnosis took place in a generic holistic fashion.

The action planning phase is also a collaborative task in which this research specified the
changes or actions that would improve the information system design. The plan described
the targeted organization and the approach to be taken. A theoretical framework (F)
guided this planned change, which is a collection of the organizational desired state and
the set of changes that would achieve this desired state.
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The third or action-taking phase is an implementation of the planned change. The
researcher and the practitioners indulged into action in the client organization leading to a
change in the organizational IS design. The researcher directed the change to ensure that
it is taking its course within the organization.

Next, this research conducted an evaluation phase in which the researcher verified if the
effects of the actions taken took effect and if those effects alleviated the security issues in
IS design. In addition, the researcher made sure that the action taken was the sole cause
of the success in the design. If the change was for some reason unsuccessful, a cyclic
iteration of action research starts. The research started the first cycle when the
intervention at the organization started.

The cyclic iteration stopped when the evaluation criteria were met as discussed in the
following sections. The final learning phase provided the emergent knowledge to the IS
research community. If the evaluation results were not successful, the learning phase will
provide insights to conduct further action research interventions. Whether the result is
successful or not, action research cycles can continue to develop further emergent
knowledge about the organization and validate theoretical assumptions.

The action research process cycle is described in Figure 7. This process is based on
Checkland (1991) model of “organized use of rational thought” which describe the action
research cyclic process where F is an intellectual framework of linked ideas (a theory),
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and M is a methodology for using this framework. Moreover, A is an area of application.
Action research cycles the research themes of F and M through A to generate reflection,
action and finally scientific findings. The real world problem and research settings are
described first; action research phases are then described in the following sections.

3.7. Research setting and organization selection
Action research was conducted in a Fortune 500 software business organization. This
organization is an American multinational software company that provides different
server, networking, and applications.

Figure 7. Cyclic Process of Action Research (Checkland, 1991)

The organization development centers reside in different geographical locations in
Florida, California, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, India, China and the United
Kingdom. The organization ranks high on the Fortune 500. The organization reports more
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than $3.5 billion in revenue with hundreds of millions in net income every year. More
than 10,000 employees work for this organization.

With this spread presence across the globe, the organization is vulnerable to various
cyber threats. There is a need for an information system that meets the organization
development requirements. The security of said information system must be ensured. The
organization was selected since the researcher worked there. The researcher had access to
organizations sensitive security information during the research. There were existing
security issues in the organization in terms of code management. This helped set up a
suitable environment for action research.

One major business process for a software corporation is to deliver software products
where product source code is built, signed, packaged and delivered. This includes a wide
infrastructure of servers, internal networks, source code management systems among
other systems such as payroll systems, collaborations systems etc. The business process
requires participation from different IS stakeholders. The spectrum of stakeholders
includes developers, staff engineers, build engineers, infrastructure engineers, and project
managers.

The software development process supports a continuous integration pipeline. The
process includes specifying requirements for the software product followed by a coding
stage. Then the code is stored in code management systems. The next stage is building
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the software then testing it. Finally, the product is packaged and delivered to customer
systems.

A critical asset for a software organization is its source code. There are several different
software development projects conducted within the organization with millions of lines
of code. The organization faced problems when managing source code access for
different software projects in a secure and efficient manner. There are more than 10,000
employees working on different projects with different source code access needs along
with thousands of automated servers that require daily access to some parts of the source
code. The existing code management system was unable to identify the right permissions
to grant for a given user or system.

An example would be involving a software development project manager and an
infrastructure engineer in granting specific access to some code for a developer. Details
on the organizational problem are discussed in detail in the diagnosis stage in the next
section. This research drew from relevant action research processes in IS and contrasted
different stages of action research in Table 5.

55
Table 5. Overview of Action Research Processes
Action
Research
Client
Diagnosis

Puhakainen &
Siponen (2010)
● One organization
● 16 Interviews
● Open Ended
Questions
● Anonymous
Surveys
● Observations

Börjesson et al.,
(2006)
● One organization
● Send survey to all
employees
● Observations

Lindgreb et al.,
(2004)
● Six organizations
● Technology review
● Workshop sessions
● Discussion and
analysis with
practitioners and
researchers

Action
Planning

●Designed program
based on problems
found in diagnosis
stage

● Collaboration with
reference group

● Develop design
principles

Action
Taking

● Training
delivered
● CEO meeting
● Issues addressed

● 2 Meetings with
strategically chosen
group members
● Apply proposed
process
● 4 meetings with
Reference group as
opinion leaders
● Interview and
feedback collection

● Implement design
principles

● Agile improvement
practices

● Competence model

Evaluation

● Users
interviewed
(personal and
group)
● Process
improvement
observed

Specifying
Learning

● IS security policy
compliance

● Focus group
● Participant
observations
● 24 semi-structured
interviews
● Open and axial
coding technique

This Research
● One organization
● 8 interviews
● 6 open-ended
questions
● Observations
● Discussions and
analysis with
practitioners and
researcher
● 8 interviews
● 7 open-ended
questions
● Collaborated with
work group on
requirement analysis for
a design of code
management system
based on organizational
requirement following
CSIS development.
● Develop design for
code management
system for distributed
code repositories.
● Meet with strategically
chosen group members
who managed old
systems.
● 8 interviews
● 14 open-ended
questions
● Feedback collection
● Process improvement
observed
● Open coding
technique
● Focus Group
Evaluation
● New system users
interviewed in Focus
Group
● Secure information
system design method
● Context risk analysis

3.7.1. Diagnosis
With the intent to identify a secure information system design, the research started the
first action research cycle by investigating the participating organizations earlier attempt
to secure its information systems and assets. Developers are the most common users of
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source code. However, infrastructure engineers manage source code repositories. Build
engineers administered code repositories and granted permission to different repositories.

A collection of systems collaborated to enable the main process of this organization,
which is producing software. The organization used a system for managing ownership
and access to various source code repositories. Different actors in the organization log
into this system using their organizational credentials to interact with source code
systems. Managers, in turn, received requests to access source code repositories and
create permissions according to what they see fit.

The existing problem was that the code management system was unable to handle
permissions correctly based on the software development projects running. The system
required manual intervention from an infrastructure engineer and a project manager to
apply a change on source code access permissions where in effect only a project manager
should be involved in applying change permissions for a given developer.
Users are required to ask administrators for specific permissions that might be then
revisited by project managers. In additions, applying code permissions in certain
countries requires certain care. There are specific rules for code access in specific
counters. This usually includes access forms that need to be signed.
The code management system was impeding the software development process. The
organization decided to switch to a distributed model for source code repositories.
However, the security of distributed source repository is questionable within the
organization.

57
There are concerns on how source code management might be applied and how to secure
code permissions. In the diagnosis phase, the researcher worked with practitioners
responsible for developing, managing and maintaining the existing source code
management system. This group in the organization was chosen as they are the experts on
the existing code management system. The researcher synthesized semi-structured
interview sessions to capture existing issues within the current system. Also capturing
concerns and perceived problems on the design of the existing systems.

The researcher asked introducing, probing and follow-up questions to better understand
the phenomena and the problems in the existing systems (Kvale & Flinders, 1997). The
researcher started with introductory qualitative research interview questions and then
possible follow-up questions (Kvale & Flinders, 1997). The researcher drew these
questions from relevant action research in IS and contextualized them to this research
study. The questions are described in Table 6. The researcher conducted interviews with
experts responsible for existing systems. The researcher then analyzed the answers and
conducted discussions with practitioners.

The open-ended questions are in line with qualitative data analysis technique (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998). IS researchers have approached data collection similarly. Questions asked
in the diagnosis stage in Puhakainen & Siponen (2010) were contextual to the study
where they were attempting to plan IS security training. They are aimed at understanding
existing awareness problems such as “Do you think security instructions in the
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organization useful?” and “In your opinion, what are the most common ways malicious
software (viruses etc.) gets into our company’s network?”.

Table 6. Diagnosis Action Questions
No.
1

2

3

4
5

6

Question

Supporting Literature

what are the most common ways malicious software
(viruses etc.) gets into our company’s network? What
are the information security problems in the existing
system?
Where can you find our company’s official
information security instructions? How are permissions
granted to users?
Are there any other security issues that you consider
important for your work? Do developers need
managers and admins to be granted access?
How often is there personnel or manual intervention
involved in granting code permissions ?
Do you think about information security only when
interacting with information security programs or
objects? What kind of access violations to source code
may occur?
What are various groups that are granted access to
source code?

Puhakainen & Siponen (2010)

Sedlack (2012)

Puhakainen & Siponen (2010)

Follow up on diagnosis question 3
Sedlack (2012)

Follow up on diagnosis question 5

In this study, similar open-ended questions that are relevant to the security of the design
of the information system were asked in order to understand the existing problems. The
suggested questionnaire was sufficient to address different aspects of existing IS design.
Other questions did arise during following action cycle. Follow up and probing questions
were risen as the semi-structured interviews took place.

3.7.2. Action Planning
Following diagnosis phase, this research followed CSIS principles in providing a secure
approach to source code management system design that fits well with the organizational
agile requirements. The researcher first collected the new code management system
requirements from the expert group using CSIS principles. System requirements were
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then defined with CSIS in mind. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the
focus group. The interview questions are described in Table 7.

The researcher presented the design plans within the same group responsible for the
management and maintenance of existing code management system. The goal in this
stage was to develop a design for a secure code management system using CSIS.
Therefore, the questions were directed towards collecting the context construct data for
the design of the new proposed system. These questions were chosen for use in the
planning the design of the information system.
Table 7. Action Planning Questions
No.
1
2

3
4
5
6
7

Question

Supporting Literature

What actors are involved in interacting with source
code?
What context are these actors involved in order to have
the need to interact with source code repositories?

Kalam et al., (2003)

What are the spatial contexts when interacting with
source code?
What are the temporal contexts when interacting with
source code, if any?
What are the prerequisites contexts when interacting
with source code?
What are the provisional contexts for interacting with
source code?
What are custom contexts when interacting with source
code?

Kalam et al., (2003)

Kalam et al., (2003)

Kalam et al., (2003)
Kalam et al., (2003)
Kalam et al., (2003)
Kalam et al., (2003)

The basis of these questions is the kernel theory OrBAC in which the researcher
attempted to derive the contexts for the proposed IS design.
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3.7.3. Action Taking
Following the action-taking plan using CSIS design principles, the researcher worked
with practitioners to implement a prototype for a secure code management system
leveraging distributed code repositories. The first action was to form a group to develop a
prototype of the code management system. Based on the contexts collected in the actionplanning phase, the researcher defined the way the new code management systems works
following requirements analyzed in the previous meetings.

The researcher conducted meetings with strategically chosen group members who
managed old systems in order to evaluate the utility of the new system. This group acted
as an opinion leader in the implementation of the code management system. They
oversaw the development and suggested changes as they saw fit. The goal in this stage
was to produce a prototype design for a secure code management system.

3.7.4. Evaluating the Results
Upon the completion of a prototype, the focus group and users of new code management
system design prototype were interviewed. The introduced change was assessed and
evaluated by collecting feedback on the utility of the new system. The interviewees were
asked open-ended design evaluation questions described in Table 8. These questions were
selected to validate whether the designed secure information system meets Siponen’s et
al., (2006) meta-design requirements and whether the theory behind the design was
validated through successful use (Baskerville & Myers 2004).
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Action research must ensure that the intervention was the sole cause for the success of the
design (Baskerville, 1999). The researcher observed for any process improvement in
security and permissions management in the new system. Questionnaire results were
classified, interview results and meeting data were then compiled Börjesson et al., (2006),
Puhakainen & Siponen (2010). Positive feedback on the use of the new system was then
observed by soliciting feedback from participants. Other cycles of action were initiated
based on the feedback received on the developed design prototype and the qualitative
data analysis.

3.8. Data Analysis
Data was collected by means of open-ended questionnaires, interviews, observations and
field notes. The interviews, field notes, and observations were transcribed on the same
day into an electronic word processing file. The names of individuals were anonymized
using codes for purposes of transcripts and data analysis to protect the identity of the
participants.

Grounded theory techniques to qualitative data analysis were followed. Data analysis
phases using coding techniques are outlined here:
-

Open Coding: The transcripts were analyzed and codes were assigned to the data
via a qualitative analysis software. Each interview transcript was examined and
codes were applied to the appropriate selection of text as interpreted by the
researcher. Once the interpretive, descriptive and pattern codes were applied, any
emergent themes that arose were analyzed.
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Table 8. Evaluating Action Questions
No.
1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8

Question

Supporting Literature

Does the design resist the impact of threats on system
objects?
Does the design meet organizations’ security
requirements?
Does the design provide abstract representation and
operations for specifying the three essential elements
of secure systems - threats, objects, and security
features (safeguards or controls) - for the three levels
of abstraction: organizational, conceptual and
technical.
Can the design be easily integrated into normal
information system development methods?
Does the design maximize the autonomy of
developers?
Is the design adaptable to forthcoming information
system development methods?
Does the system enable DevOps agility?

Siponen et al., (2006)

How do you feel that information security improved
in the project?
What changes enhanced information security in the
project?
Do you feel project members better understand
information security relating to the project? Why?
Do you feel this project remains aligned with
organizational goals while providing balanced
information security? Why?
Did the research model help improve member
information security perspectives relating to the
organization? How?
Did the research model improve project information
security? How?
Would you change the model for the next project
iteration, adding or removing elements? Why? How?

9
10
11

12

13
14

-

Siponen et al., (2006)
Siponen et al., (2006)

Siponen et al., (2006)
Siponen et al., (2006)
Siponen et al., (2006)
Follow up on evaluation question 6
Sedlack (2012)
Sedlack (2012)
Sedlack (2012)
Sedlack (2012)

Sedlack (2012)

Sedlack (2012)
(Sedlack, 2012)

Axial Coding: Following intensive open coding, identified categories were
brought together into groupings. Axial coding was used to determine the
relationships and patterns between the various codes. Additional comments and
code maps were developed to assist the researcher in the visualization of patterns
and themes contained within the interpretation of the data. These
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groupings resemble themes and are generally new ways of seeing and
understanding the phenomenon under study.

The theoretical framework must guide the analysis (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). The codes
were driven by CSIS design constructs. Patterns and themes arose from the analysis to
provide comparison and contrast to determine conceptual explanations of the study. The
source material was grouped together using the identified codes. The resulting design was
examined to determine if the application of the theoretical framework addressed the
research problem.

3.9. Validity Criteria for Action Research
Action research must have a practical outcome (Baskerville & Myers 2004). This
corresponds to the internal validity of action research (Baskerville & Wood-Harper,
1998). In addition, action research must have an explicit underlying theory before
conducting research; it must demonstrate a clear contribution to research (Baskerville &
Myers 2004). This corresponds to the external validity of action research.

To ensure the validity of this research, Baskerville & Wood-Harper (1998) validity
criteria for IS action research were applied:


The research should be set in multivariate social situations.



The observations should be recorded and analyzed in an interpretive frame.



Researcher actions should intervene in the research setting.



The method of data collection should include participatory observation.
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Changes in the social setting should be studied.



The immediate problem in the social setting must have been resolved during the
research: The current organizational problem must be resolved during the study
according to the evaluations made by focus group.



The research should illuminate a theoretical framework that explains how the
actions led to a favorable outcome.

3.10. Summary
Leveraging design science paradigm, CSIS artifact was presented. The novelty of the
artifact is the use of context in IS design. It allowed bridging a research gap by explaining
how a socio-technical secure design approach can be integrated into actual IS design. A
demonstrative example captured supporting evidence for the first research hypothesis.
This research introduced a method and investigated how to integrate socio-technical
aspects in IS development stages using the context in IS and organization. The process of
evaluation using action research was described along with data collection and analysis
processes. The following chapter describes the cycles of the organizational action
research.
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Chapter 4
Journey to Cloud Cadence – Action Research
4.1. Introduction
The empirical part of this dissertation concentrated on exploring the truth and utility of
the CSIS design artifact presented in chapter 3. The empirical study was conducted
within a software organization. Because security is a sensitive subject for the company,
all identities have been disguised.

The rest of the chapter presents the organization throughout the transition towards a new
Source Code System (SCM) and a new SCM management system. The design of a new
SCM management system as per the CSIS design artifact is described in section 4.2. The
next section describes the action research cycles (Baskerville, 1999). This includes
interactions between the researcher and practitioner throughout the process. Finally, focus
group discussion analysis is described.

4.2. Adopting a New Source Control Paradigm
The researcher started seeking approval for the study with the organization in May 2016
and was engaged from June 2016 until December 2016 at SC located in the southeast
region of the United States. SC is one of the Fortune 500 software business organization.
This organization is an American multinational software company that provides different
server, networking, and applications. The organization development centers reside in
different geographical locations in Florida, California, Australia, Ukraine, Canada,
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Denmark, Germany, India, China and the United Kingdom. More than 10,000 employees
work for this organization.

SC organization was attempting to secure its assets including source code and application
data. During the same time, SC was transitioning from Agile (Börjesson et al., 2006) to
DevOps (Loukides, 2012) engineering to adapt to a cloud-based release cadence. The
number of software releases in the cloud is much higher than regular on-premise product
releases. There is a higher number of changes to adapt to user requirements in the cloud.
SC organization must increase its release cycles to adapt to a continuously changing
market. It has become almost an industry standard to adopt a DevOps approach. One of
the main challenges is the changing nature of requirements for the design. The project
manager described the problem
“it’s hard to design a system for today when you know it’s going to
change. I know the security requirements are constantly changing.”
Microsoft went on a similar journey towards a cloud-based distributed version control
system. SC attempted to capture lessons learned from Microsoft. Microsoft described its
journey to transition its processes and shared their experience online (Guckenheimer,
2016). SC organization planned migration from centralized version control systems to
distributed version control systems as part of the cloud cadence transition. In the
following, a brief description of version control systems is described and how the
migration is perceived in the organization is presented.

Version control systems are divided into two groups, centralized and distributed.
Centralized version control systems such as ClearCase, CVS, Subversion (SVN) or
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Perforce are based on the idea that there is a single centralized copy of the project source
code. Usually, the code is hosted on a code server, and the IS users submit their
"changes" to the server.

Distributed version control systems like Mercurial and Git do not necessarily rely on a
central server to store all the versions of a project’s files. Instead, every users "clones" a
copy of a repository and has the full history of the project on their own hard drive. This
copy (or “clone”) has all of the metadata of the original. The IS users can "commit" their
changes to their local copy until they are comfortable to "push" their code changes to
other users.

There are several advantages with using distributed version control systems over
centralized systems. Performing actions other than pushing and pulling "changes" is
faster because the user only needs to access the drive, not a remote server. “Committing”
new code changes can be done locally without anyone else seeing them. Once a group of
code changes is ready, all of them can be “pushed” at once. Everything except code
“pushing” and code “pulling” can be done without a connection to the organization,
which gives more flexibility to system users. IS users can work remotely, temporary code
changes need not to be submitted. Changes can be “stashed” if the user wants to save
their work at a certain state.
However, permission control can be tricky since users have their own copy of the whole
code. Security concerns stem from the openness of distributed version control systems.
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One disadvantage of distributed control systems is that every user will have a full copy of
all code history. This issue raised security and usability concerns.

All IS users would have a full copy of the code including its history which raised security
concerns to IS administrators. In addition, the existing system stored binary files within
the project source code in large amounts. The distributed system approach was not
suitable for the existing system since all copies of binary files would be stored on the
user’s hard disk making it full.

In this context, distributed systems have an advantage over centralized systems in that
they offer the ability for the user to create their own (lightweight) version of the code
locally to develop a certain feature. For example, a topic branch might be created per
work item and cleaned up when the changes are merged into the mainline. This allows
developers autonomy when developing product features (Siponen, 2002).

However, distributed version control systems were largely questioned from a security
perspective in SC organization. Because of their distributed nature, they allow developers
to clone a copy of the whole code branch he\she is viewing. Permissions in a centralized
version control system can be as granular as a single file as opposed to a whole branch in
a distributed version control system. The participants perceived this as an information
security gap in code management in what was considered more granularly controllable in
terms of view and permission control in a centralized version control system as opposed
to what the transition would introduce.
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When SC relied on centralized version control systems for its software development
purposes, a security audit in the organization highly recommended a well-defined
business process. A participant commented,
“So the way it works now is we have a tool. So we went for a security audit
a little while back – a couple of years ago – and they recommended, you
know, having sort of a double approval for creating accounts and granting
access to codes. So what we ended up doing was we wrote a tool that would
allow you to raise a request for an account and then have your manager
approve that request and then have an administrator approve the request
and then the account is created. It’s a really, really good tool. Very
awesome ‘Sarcasm’.”
SC corporation was dependent on a management system and some semi-automated
process that was developed within the organization to manage its many instances of
centralized version control systems. The researcher intervention started with introducing
a design for a management system that helps adapt to the transition to a distributed
system following CSIS.

4.3. Background and Participants
During the initial stage of action research, understanding the practitioner’s perspective is
essential. This requires analysis of a holistic organizational perspective. This section
describes the analysis of organization interview questions.

The interview questions about a new system design were analyzed with CSIS design
artifact in mind. Open coding was done using Atlas.ti v. 8.0.25 software. The researcher
developed the design model for the management system by categorizing data through the
artifact's constructs: Roles, Activities, Views and Contexts.
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During action research cycles, Fifty-two meetings were held. These meetings included
Twenty-Four one-on-one interviews and unofficial follow-up meetings. The meetings
took place over 7 months, between the researcher and organizational personnel to
understand existing systems security issues, identify the goal of the project, discuss new
system design requirements, and provide insights during review stages of action cycles.

The interviewees were selected from a pool of people assigned to work on the
implementation of the project and the transition phases. Out of sixteen people who
worked on the project, eight participated in the research (see Table 9). Interviews and
follow-ups took place in the workspace environment, and they were conducted during
different action research cycles. The size of the company made it possible to interview all
employees several times during the research process. The researcher then moderated a
focus group discussion to confirm the utility of CSIS in comparison with SARC
(D'Aubeterre et al., 2008).

4.4. Research Strategy and Position of the Researcher
In this action research, the researcher was not regarded as an objective, passive outsider.
The researcher was a part of SC transition process. The researcher was involved in some
of other technical aspects suggested in the project such as minimizing the size of code
repository and enabling workflows to function within different subsystems. His further
responsibilities included the planning and implementation of the new management
system design during the second research cycle.
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Table 9. Research Participants
No.

Participant Code Name

Organizational Role

Participated
in study

1

G

Senior Product Development Manager

Yes

2

A

Life Cycle Management

Yes

3

D

Yes

4

H

Software Engineer \ Existing system
Administrator
Software Engineer

5

E

Senior Software Engineer

Yes

Yes

6

F

Software Engineer

Yes

7

B

Senior Software Engineer

Yes

8

C

Senior Software Engineer

Yes

10

J

Principal Software Engineer

No

11

K

Principal Architect

No

12

L

Product Development Director

No

13

M

Product Manager

No

14

N

Senior Product Development Manager

No

15

O

Principal Software Engineer

No

16

P

Senior Software Engineer

No

The researchers’ involvement for some of the design tasks was individual, but
cooperation between the research and the collaborators was conducted in the study in
describing and analyzing system design requirements (Baskerville & Wood-Harper,
1996). The action research intervention was aimed at providing a secure system design
for distributed source control that meets the organizational security requirements and
ensures the state of security in the organization. Another aim was to increase the security
awareness of the participants through the use of the CSIS artifact. The business process
objective is for the organization is to produce software products.

Information was collected and analyzed constantly throughout the research process using
interviews. The interviews were conducted using open questions governing information
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security issues in the existing management system, and description of workflows. The
questions were open, but detailed, aiming to explore employees’ description of issues at
state.

Three types of interviews were used. The participants were interviewed in normal social
interactions and using formal interview techniques. The data was collected by means of
interviews. Field notes were collected. In addition, some of the interviews were
conducted online where the interviewer had an online video conversation while
presenting questions and ideas to interviewees. This was done due to the international
nature of SC. Some of the employees involved in the project were located in different
areas of the world. Moreover, some of the interviews were conducted in informal social
situations, the researcher had to follow up on some feedback that was given during a
formal session.

When doubts arose about an interviewee’s statements, it was verified immediately during
the interview or later the same day to ensure consistent feedback to the action cycles. To
avoid having an influence on the interview questions, the researcher started with general
questions (Stringer, 2013) (e.g., "what do you think are security issues in the organization
?") and then followed up on details that focus on the system design (e.g., how do you
think the process looks like in the new system?). The aim was to identify the themes that
emerged from the data collected. Moreover, whether these themes supported the kernel
design theory and the CSIS artifact. The analysis formed the basis for developing the
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intervention. One of the main challenges faced during design stages was the changing
nature of security requirements of the organizational IS.
4.5. Source Control Management System Project
The transition from a centralized source control system to a distributed source control
system project was selected by the researcher for action research. This project was
selected for research because of its security requirements. The goal was to develop a
management IS that support the security requirements of SC for distributed version
control systems. This allowed the researcher to demonstrate the adaptability of the CSIS
context to highly changing requirements.

In June 2016, the researcher met with project management to discuss possible candidates
for the study. This action research consisted of five research cycles, which are described
in the following subsections.

4.5.1 Research Cycle 1
There are five stages in each action research cycles. These are diagnosis, action planning,
action taking, evaluations and specifying learning. In this cycle, initial interviews
discussed existing security issues. Planning and action taking focused on the new IS
design.
STAGE 1: IS Problems Diagnosis
In order to provide a secure system design for SC distributed version control systems.
The system requirements must be captured. The first stage in the diagnosis phase is to

74
explore the existing systems issues and capabilities and capture the participant’s
perspective on their systems security. The researcher aimed to identify current security
issues, concerns, practices to help identify existing problems in the existing management
system. The researcher asked questions described in Table 6.

The main theme of security concerns was related to employees remotely logging in with
their personal devices and downloading source code. There was a concern of external
devices logging in to the network as these devices cannot be controlled by the
organization and they simply may be stolen. Also, injecting malware into the source code
systems via USB sticks, downloading malicious software via web pages. In addition,
there were concerns regarding phishing emails.

There seemed to be a lack of security awareness amongst participants of the study. Four
out of eight participants had no idea where to find security-related information to the
organization e.g. security design guidelines, security policies. Participants’ comments
included,
“I believe our security team may run our website. But if so, there’s no
requirements to go to it and I don’t know that anyone ever does go to it.”
“It’s probably scattered around. I don’t know,”
“I don’t see any of that. I don’t know where I could find it.”

Specific to the existing management system, participants have monitored for possible
malware being checked in into the system. A participant said,
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“You could have people inject things that you don’t want into your code,
whether it’s malware or viruses, Trojans, just things that lower the
performance of the code even.”
Another problem was the fact that user permissions get “stale” on the system. When a
user starts using the system and then leaves the team, his permissions are not revoked.
Stale permissions allow possible reentry to the system that might cause security incidents
like theft or retaliation. Participants noted,
“Gaining access is request-based. And no one requests their access be
removed. We accumulate access but never deprecate access, even if we
happen to come across something that looks stale.”
“Sticking to the existence of one of the weaknesses of the existing setup is
that we accumulate but never remove permissions. I just today found
permissions like from 2006 for a user that no longer exist in the
organization.”
The diagnosed issues indicate poor management in system user accounts. The
management system was added as another layer of security by security auditors, it was
not considered during initial stages of system design. There are different manual
processes that are poorly defined when it comes to managing users. A participant said,
“every time someone needs more access or a new account. Then at some
point a admin or a build team members acting in that role is going to be
involved. I would say that’s at an absolute minimum several times a week
and more likely several times per day that that’s happening. It’s a little hard
to get a quantification of it because there are probably eight or nine
different people who may respond to them and take care of a given request.
So those requests are being spread out across the team, essentially. And I
don’t monitor what each person is doing for each little thing – like that
little”
In addition, four out of eight participants complained about the lack of auditing on such
permission changes. The next stage of the action cycle is to fully define the different
organizational roles in order to alleviate the user management problem. The researcher

76
identified roles in the organization based on the participant’s descriptions. The identified
roles that were found are, Developers, Architects, Testers, Development Leads, Gate
Keepers, Escalation, Graphics, Publications, and Engineering Services. In the next
subsection action, planning for the system design is discussed.

STAGE 2: Action Planning
The second phase of the first action research cycle is planning a new management system
design. The research framework for system design followed CSIS artifact. Artifact
constructs were described to the participants in order to collect data in the form of system
requirements. Essentially, the participants were asked questions in Table 7. The questions
focused on defining Roles, Activities, Actions, Views, Objects, Contexts from the
participant’s perspective.
Answers varied on contexts, participants provided different contexts for the business
processes they described. This helped enrich the design artifact with various contexts.
Themes emerged from the participant’s definitions of the design constructs. These themes
are described here.

Subjects and Roles at SC focused on the software development process given the
organization nature. However, the organization works in a collaborative manner in order
to deliver the software to the customer. There are software architects, software testers,
graphical designers and technical writers. There are also software components owners,
development managers, gatekeepers, and leaders along with software continuous
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integration build team and a source control system management team. Finally, there are
technical support and escalation engineers.

Notably, these roles are replicated across all geographical locations at SC. However,
there are different regulations in each country. This makes the design requirements
different for different roles in different countries. The existing system replicated these
roles for geographical locations in order to enforce such rules, which created another
source of confusion for user management. There is also non-engineering roles in SC such
as legal, accounting and HR. However, since they do not interact with the system they
were not considered in the design.

Activities and Actions at SC also focused on the development process. Developers at
SC work on developing software product features and fixing bugs in existing software
releases. Architects look for design patterns in the software. Testers ensure the quality of
the software and report bugs; they also work on automating test cases for the software.
Graphical designers work on creating the graphics for the software UI and technical
writers work on writing software documentation. Software component owners and
managers ensure that software features they own are delivered on time and they also
work on managing development cycles. Gatekeepers ensure that software changes
included in the next release meet some sanity and testing criteria.

The continuous integration build team is responsible for wrapping the code into a
software package that can be delivered to the customer. They also handle the life cycle

78
and maintenance of the product. The SCM team ensures the existing centralized source
control systems are always running and making sure they are always backed up.
Technical support and escalations report customer feedback and analyze their input based
on their knowledge of user manual and documentation.

All of the activities described so far are considered read and write actions to system
objects. Another action called “approve” was considered as a special case of “write”
where a code moderator approves code changes. System admins, component owners, and
build engineers are permitted to “delegate” permissions to other users in the systems.
System admins are responsible for all “creation” actions including, the creation of users
in the existing management system, “creating” new code repositories in existing version
control systems. In addition, all system roles are permitted to “log in” to the system to
initialize their view.
Views and Objects at SC augmented various assets including source code and
infrastructure. The majority of the work at SC is being done on source code files. The
files are stored in code repositories, which are hosted on source code systems. The
identified system objects are the hosting servers and the code repositories. The views on
hosting servers are defined as software view to the virtual machines running on servers
and physical view to physical access servers. The code repositories are organized in terms
of project names and in some cases in terms of the objective to the role. For example,
there is a code repository for graphics and a code repository for technical documentation.
However, each software component is code repository.
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Repositories and folder paths can be branched (i.e. copied with a new name with a
pointer to the “HEAD” repository), these repositories can be used to release software or
lock at a certain point for a certain released version and supporting that repository for
maintenance. For example, software release “X” branch, legacy release “Y” or current
product branch “Main”. Similar concepts are used to derive the system views. A view is
constructed for projects developers are working on, a view for graphics branches, a view
for documentation branches and also views for main and released code branches.

System and Business Process Contexts at SC were identified during planning. The
participants were introduced to the context concept in the action planning stage. They
defined different context to be used in the design of the system following different
contexts available in CSIS artifact.
As a prerequisite context, developers are only allowed to submit code if and only if the
code compiles. Another prerequisite context was that the code must pass secure function
checks e.g. use secure printf functions. Also, manager approval is a prerequisite for
developer’s ability to access project code.

In terms of spatial contexts depending on the subject location, a restriction was enforced
on certain geographical locations. Developers in certain geographical locations had to
sign a non-disclosure agreement to ensure the confidentiality of software source code. In
addition, spatially, users remoting into the management system must be connecting
through virtual private network to the corporate network. In addition, user locale must be
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ensured when connecting to the system ensuring that users are connecting to the servers
residing in their own country.

In terms of user-declared contexts, depending on the subject objective the participants
discussed many contexts. First, two-factor authentication when logging in to the
management system. Second, ensuring that account is created when logging in to the
management system. A target is assigned to work on a project. A user joins a team or a
user’s switches teams or leaves the organization. Finally, previous releases are accessible
to the user when attempting to view new releases. In the following action-taking phase,
the design of a management system for distributed version control for SC is described.

STAGE 3: Action Taking - New System Design
Using the emerged themes from analysis of coded data. During the third stage of the first
action research cycle, the researcher constructed the organizational IS design using CSIS
artifact. Then the researcher presented the artifacts to the participants for review and
evaluations. The design artifact is described in Appendix C.

STAGE 4: Evaluation of Design
The fourth stage of the first research cycle was to evaluate the resulting system design
artifact. The participants were introduced to the design artifact of the management
system. The interviews focused on explaining the design artifact to participants and then
collecting feedback. The interview questions also discussed meeting (Siponen et al.,
2006) secure IS meta-design requirements described in Table 8. From IS practitioners
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point of view that participated in the study, the design meets meta-design requirements
for secure system design.

The participants agreed that the design artifact meets the organization security
requirements (Siponen et al., 2006). A participant stated,

“it seemed to have all the requirements we had built in”

On an organizational, conceptual and technical level, safeguards and controls are
described as participants have noted,

“I think objects and security features are certainly visible in the diagram
across organizational as well as conceptual and technical. I think you
covered that for objects and security features. I see the countermeasures to
the threats in the diagram. For example, hacking in from outside the
company. That’s blocked by you have to be in a VPN or in one of our
offices.”
“We have enough information to safeguard whatever is required”

The participants agreed that the design artifact described the requirements for developing
the secure system. The design can be integrated into existing development methods; it
also enabled DevOps agility. It can be adaptable to IS development (Siponen et al.,
2006).
“I mean, it looks like there’s a lot of requirements that are shown in this
diagram – use cases and things that need to be developed within in. So like
that would work pretty well.”
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“It has separated branches which can be developed in parallel. So in terms
of the development method I’m thinking it should not be very hard to fit it
into the current development method”.
The design also enabled developer’s autonomy (Siponen et al., 2006). A participant
commented,
“I certainly think it would. I think there’s separation there. And then you
could easily figure out a list of what needs to be done to support the
system from the diagram.”. Another participant also said, “I think as much
as you could say is that it gives them autonomy so long as they stay within
the framework”.

The participants reasoned that the design is adaptable to forthcoming information system
development methods (Siponen et al., 2006).
“It’s fairly generic, nothing tied to a specific technology”

“Yeah, I think it’s fairly generic. There’s nothing tied.”

“Yeah, I mean, I don’t think this design matters, right? That’s the beauty of
the methodologies is that they can be applied to any type of design. Really
the methodology is about the team that you have and what people are
comfortable with and how they do development stuff.”

The participants felt like information security improved in the project (Siponen et al.,
2006).
“Design of a proper workflow. Capturing and documenting the Intended
use of the system is a huge improvement. Also, enforcing context that were
never enforced before.”
“you’ve considered a lot more around the overall security of the system.”
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“Yes, there will certainly be consistency and process that there hasn’t been
in the past and that’s a good thing. You know, because this should in
principle have caught everything that we currently deal with and we will
actually now have, you know… That consistency is important in security,
but obviously it’s implementing that and actually ensuring that it’s adhered
to.”
“I think having things that are a bit more automatic and things that are a
bit more, you know, context aware… Certainly things like, you know, I have
to be a member of this group and I have to be at a certain location, I have
to be in certain business hours and stuff like that, like that’s more powerful
than we have today so I think that’s definitely much better.”

Along with information security improvement, the balance between security and the
organizational objective was maintained. Participants commented on the design,

“I thought it was pretty balanced the way you just asked that question. I
think it definitely looked at what do people need to be able to do and then
how do we make sure that we are protecting against threats in doing that.
And I would say balance is the best thing you can have in terms of security,
personally.”
“… absolutely this process should definitely aim… head towards that.”

The design process also improved information security perspectives relating to the
organization as perceived by participants.

“Yeah, you sure have some advantages to improve with because we
gathered together to brainstorm about a lot of possibilities.”
“Yeah, so that gave me like a lot of different insights on like at the time of
designing a piece, right. So more of the various aspects just to be kept in
mind. Like the different scenarios, the different actors and their roles, how
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they’re interlinked to each other, and one role can like be superseded by
the other and so on. So those are the various information which you and I
did gain from the discussions what we had.”
“The design made me think about security. The design model used roles,
subjects and objects, I suspected these terms come from security, I had to
look it up.”

STAGE 5: Specifying Learning
Capturing the security requirements along with functional requirements during design
helped achieve improvement in the project. In addition, a core aspect was capturing
business process context for security improvement and awareness. A participant said,

“The context in which people should be allowed to perform activities. I do
think contextually aware security is definitely the future of security and
needs to be included in the model like you’ve added here”

The extensibility of contexts was attractive to developers, a participant said,
“I think over time obviously you’d probably want more in different contexts
and stuff like that. So I think there would be additions going forward. You
might want a little more logging or something. I mean, these are things that
we can add to the system as time goes by”

Despite positive results, the need for further development remains. There were issues
identified in the design artifact. The designed entailed complexity, it was prevalent more
for specific roles. Participants noted complexity in the design,
“I’m thinking this system it looks like complex; however,”.
“yeah, even we have different separated branches can be developed in
parallel, like chop them to different pieces. However, we still have
complex role with a lot of…”
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There were issues providing helpful implementation hints to developers of the system. A
participant said,
“I think there is an extra step in between of taking this diagram and
breaking that into… Obviously you can get requirements in there very easily
from that diagram, but there’s still the breaking that into action items that
I think is a separate thing.”

The initial cycle resulted in an initial IS design. Based on collected feedback, the design
needed revisiting to alleviate complexity.

4.5.2 Research Cycle 2
It was evident that the initial design resulting from the first action cycle was complex.
The second cycle focused on revising the design to simplify readability. During this
cycle, a revised design was presented to participants.

STAGE 1: New System Design Diagnosis
A secure design for a management system of distributed version control systems was
presented to participants in the first action cycle. The researcher asked questions about
the utility of the design. The collected feedback indicated high complexity in the design.
The participants reported readability issues for complex roles.
“Like this section – the build section I think you have on the screen now –
is an incredibly tangled mess down there right now”
“We still have complex role with a lot of…”
“If there was a way to highlight a role when clicking on it...”
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The researcher agreed that complex roles have complex artifacts that are hard to read.
The overall artifact provides a holistic picture of the system design, but it makes it hard to
investigate a specific business process. This, in turn, was impeding readability of the
artifact.

STAGE 2: Action Planning
The holistic artifact was big in size. In order to increase the readability of the artifact and
alleviate the complexity of the system design. The researcher decided to chop the artifact
of the design based on the role following participant’s feedback, also maintaining the full
artifact on the overall system for reference. There should be no changes in design
semantics but rather present the work in a more focused manner.

STAGE 3: Action Taking
The researcher worked on refining the new system design into components based on role.
Even though the full artifact provides a holistic view of the system, the researcher added
artifacts depicting workflows for all roles to ease the presentation of the design. The
researcher took into consideration the feedback resulting from the first cycle. The design
artifacts are presented in Appendix C.

STAGE 4: Evaluation
The researcher kept the full design artifact intact and added separate artifacts that are
more narrowly focused on the business process for all organizational roles. The artifacts
helped shape a user story that can be developed. This allowed for more agility for
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possible system implementation. Participants felt like DevOps approaches would be
applicable to implement the design. A participant said,
“I think we can use Kanban to track that”

STAGE 5: Specifying Learning
There still was arguing opinions about the effectiveness and information richness of the
new design artifacts or the split artifacts. A participant said,
“I don’t know if I like the fact that you split everything apart. I mean, it’s
easier to focus in on certain areas but it’s harder to see the whole. But I
think that’s just personal preference.”
“I was going to say I actually quite like the fact it’s broken up because then
you don’t get too distracted by, you know, other arrows and other, you
know, things going on…. Yeah, other things going on”

The initial artifact was more suitable for complete system analysis and the added artifacts
were used for creating user stories. Despite the improved presentation of the system
design. There still was concerns about the semantic understanding of the workflow. A
participant noted
“… still all I see is circles and arrows. I know you did explain what they
mean those but if you did not…”

4.5.3 Research Cycle 3
The revised artifact from the second research action cycle alleviated complexity.
However, the design still needed revising. In this research cycle. The design is adjusted to
follow literature notation (D’Aubeterre et al., 2008). This helped differentiated design
constructs from a participant perspective.
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STAGE 1: Diagnosis of SC Management System Design Artifacts
All constructs were depicted in the artifact and the design model using the same shape.
The items in the resulting design look the same. This caused misinterpretation of the
design artifact. The constructs of the CSIS design artifact must be clearly defined in order
to convey the semantics of the design.

The researcher decided to revise the design artifact. The participants agreed that the
artifact represents the requirements of the business process but it is still rather confusing,
as all components look the same. This research adopted D’Aubeterre et al., (2008)
notation in the design artifact. The revised design artifact enforces labeling constructs in
the resulting design artifact. In addition, actors, roles, and objects use a special shape to
distinguish them among other constructs. However, since there is no defined shape for
context in IS literature, this researcher adopted pentagon to distinguish it amongst the
others.

STAGE 2: Planning Revised Revisions of CSIS Artifact and Design Model
The researcher worked on revising the CSIS artifact to adopt to the changes identified in
the diagnosis stage of the action cycle. The revised CSIS artifact is introduced in Figure
8.
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Figure 8. Revised CSIS Artifact

STAGE 3: Action Taking
The researcher refined the organizational IS design based on the revised CSIS artifact.
There was no further feedback from participants at this cycle except the addition of
labeling. The design artifacts are presented in Appendix C.

STAGE 4: Evaluating the Revised Design at SC
The revised design was clear to participants. They were able to easily identify and
distinguish between Context, Actors, Roles, and Views. The resulting artifacts helped
alleviate confusion and increase readability of the design. From a research perspective,
the design artifact aligns with IS literature. From a practitioner’s perspective, the revised
design is much easier to understand.
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STAGE 5: Specifying Learning
The participants felt more confident about the success of implementation after they felt
more in control of the system design. The artifacts looked much clearer and easier to
capture and understand. After analyzing the business processes workflows in the resulting
design artifact and during a brainstorming session, it seemed obvious to the researcher
and participants that there are particular contexts that need more attention from a security
perspective. For example, the developer submitting code that does not compile is not
necessarily a high-security threat. However, logging in the system without having a user
created should be considered a high-risk threat. These ideas provoked the researcher to
revise the design artifact to highlight these ideas.

At the end of the third research cycle, the design met IS and sociotechnical requirements.
However, further information seemed to have revealed in the revised artifacts. The finding
were then analyzed in the next cycle.

4.5.4. Research Cycle 4
After multiple iterations of the new system design. The participants developed a focus on the
security aspects of the system design. The introduction of context allowed participants to
think of possible system violation scenarios. Those violations were diagnosed in this cycle.

STAGE 1: Diagnosis of Risks in System Design
During the third action research cycle, it was noticed that there are different levels of risks
associated with different contexts in the resulting design artifact. This was iterated back to
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the CSIS artifact. The CSIS artifact was extended to include risk levels to possible attack
vectors that are associated with business process contexts.

Since possible attack may occur by violating system contexts. System contexts monitor
over possible attack surfaces of the system. However, the violation may not be of high
risk. There are low, medium and high levels of risks that may be associated with a
context in the workflow description.

STAGE 2: Identifying Risks in CSIS
To identify the risk level of context violation, the CSIS artifact must identify the level of
risks for context violation. To identify and highlight high-risk levels in the CSIS artifacts
colors are used. The design artifact for SC was revised to include risk level for business
process contexts. Red was used in high-risk contexts, Yellow was used for medium level
risk contexts, Green was used for low-level risk contexts. A participant noted,
“Yeah, in the background, though. But what I can do is… I had the same
thought. But I was thinking maybe light them up in colors.”

STAGE 3: Revising the design at SC
The researcher revised the design artifacts at SC that resulted from the third action cycle.
The researcher identified the risks and highlighted with the designated colors. The
contexts associated with activities related to security operations were perceived to have
the highest risks. For example, log in operations, permissions changes would have higher
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risks than user submitting invalid code. The resulting designs are presented in Appendix
C.
STAGE 4: Evaluating the Results
The participants felt that the introduction of colors makes the system developer careful
when implementing workflows. Risks are higher than the cost of implementing these
features if the context is violated when the system is implemented. No further
modifications were suggested.

STAGE 5: Specifying Learning
Context as any other artifact construct can be assigned a risk weight. A secure system
design can include risk factors during design stages. This is in addition to security
requirements during design stages. No further changes were suggested to the CSIS
artifact or the resulting design model.

4.5.5. Research Cycle 5
The final artifact was presented to participants. All were satisfied with the resulting
artifact. Since the artifact and the intervention solved the organizational problem, this
ended action research in the study. There is room for improvement for CSIS in future
research endeavors.
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During initial action research cycle, the researcher diagnosed existing IS security issues.
Then planned, designed and reviewed initial design for new IS using CSIS. Feedback was
then collected.

In the second action research cycle, the artifact was perceived as monolithic and
complex. Issues were diagnosed and the design was adjusted to divide the artifact into
multiple components highlighting the workflow for organizational roles. Feedback was
then collected.

In the third action research cycle, design constructs were still being misinterpreted as
there was distinctions in the constructs depicted in the artifact. The issue was diagnosed
and the design was adjusted to follow D’Aubeterre et al. (2008) notation. Pentagon is
suggested for context as there is no standard in literature. Feedback was then collected.

In the fourth action research cycle, certain contexts violations were perceived by
participants to have a higher risk than others were. The observation was diagnosed and
the design was adjusted to highlight the risk level of context violation on the design using
color (low, medium, high) (green, yellow, red) respectively. Feedback was then
collected. During the fifth action research cycle, no further adjustments were suggested,
the final design was accepted to the organization and the action research cycles iterations
stopped. Focus group was then initiated.
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The utility of the CSIS artifact was evident during action research cycles. Collected
feedback helped verify that the resulting artifact is information equivalent to that of
SARC (D’Aubeterre et al., 2008). This, in turn, showed evidence to support the second
research hypothesis in the study. Following, the researcher conducted a focus group
amongst all IS practitioners participating in the study to discuss and evaluate the design
artifact.

4.6. Focus Group for Design Artifact Refinement and Evaluation
There were no further iterations as no changes to the CSIS artifact or the design were
suggested. As the design solved the organizational problem, the researcher needed to
further validate the research hypotheses. To ensure the rigor of this research, the focus
group was used as a confirmatory method to test hypotheses (Tremblay et al., 2010).

The SARC design artifact was introduced to the participants during a focus group
discussion. Focus groups allow for an open format and are flexible enough to handle a
wide range of design topics and domains (Tremblay et al., 2010). This helped create a
rich amount of qualitative data about SARC and CSIS from an IS practitioner’s perspective.

Planning a Focus Group
To compare if SARC and CSIS are informationally equivalent, The researcher used the
same data that was collected and coded for constructing the CSIS design artifacts to
create equivalent SARC artifact. The researcher presented these artifacts to the
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participants after explaining the SARC artifact during the focus group. The resulting
SARC artifact is presented in Appendix C.

The researcher conducted a focus group to include all participants that were interviewed
individually in previous action cycles. The meeting was conducted online to
accommodate the international nature of SC. Some participants had to connect during
their nighttime to join the discussion. The focus group meeting was conducted during
business work hours locally. A pretest questioning route (Tremblay et al., 2010) during
focus group meeting discussed on meeting secure system meta-design criteria (Siponen et
al., 2006). Comparison between CISD and SARC in terms of representing the system
requirements was conducted.

As a final step in planning the focus group, Tremblay et al., (2010) suggested finishing
the focus group with a task where the focus group participants are asked to utilize and
evaluate the artifact. Possible users of the system of the system participated in eliciting
the requirements for the system, they were asked to evaluate the system design. The
researcher worked on implementing the system workflows related to developers and
administrators using the artifacts that resulted in the fourth action researcher cycle.
The researcher implemented the prototype as an independent web service that monitors
over distributed version control systems operations and validates business process
contexts. The system also implements the workflows as described in the design artifacts
along with defined contexts. The researcher presented the new system early prototype to
the participants during the focus group.
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Conducting the Focus Group
Based on observation, participants joined the meeting with a positive attitude. The team
was eager for the transition towards a new system, which created excitement (Tremblay
et al., 2010).

All participants were presented with SARC and CSIS artifacts beginning with an
explanation of the motivation and theory between both approaches. Participants were
then presented with different organizational scenarios and designs using CSIS and SARC.
Following an explanation of different scenarios on where and how the CSIS and SARC
could be utilized, a description of the details of SC organization IS design using CSIS and
SARC was discussed. Design artifacts for SARC and CSIS were presented.

Finally, users were presented with the early prototype to examine and utilize. The system
works independently of distributed version control system. However, logging it to the
system allows for re-evaluating system contexts. This can be noticed in Figure 9a, it
shows an IS administrator logging in to the system.
The context status for the admin is valid. However, overall IS context is invalid, a user is
attempting access to source code prior to signing NDA agreement as shown in figure 9b.
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Figure 9a. Management System Prototype for Distributed Version Control System Based on CSIS Design
Artifact

Figure 9b. Management System Prototype for Distributed Version Control System Based on CSIS Design
Artifact

The administrators’ contexts are valid; however, the overall systems contexts are invalid
since there was a user that needed to fulfill a spatial context requirement. An email alert
is already sent to IS administrators reporting the incident.

98
Evaluating the Results
In terms of security control, the participants felt that there is no description of security
controls while describing secure business processes in the SARC artifact.
“It just feels like a very simplistic view to me, where it’s not really even
including security. It’s just saying developers use the code repo.”
“Now, isn’t this security like…? So it’s role-based security, right? So you
log in as an administrator you get access to certain things. You log in as a
user you get access to a different set of things. You log in as a backup user
you might have a different set of things. You log in as a reviewer, different…
So this is all pre… So this is similar to CSIS’s, but I think you can think of
it like the contexts are all predefined and they cannot change”

Applicability to IS development was discussed during the focus group for both CSIS and
SARC. Participants felt like both designs are implementable however, they did not feel
that SARC offers much in terms of security
“I would say this would actually be implementable, but it would be a very
insecure system.”

Since objects are used from a low-level perspective, this restricts granularity in defining
permissions on objects, unlike CSIS artifacts which can build up a view of projects.
“Well, I see like there’s sub design that maybe isn’t reflected here. Like, for
example, a developer gets access to code. But if he’s an X developer he
might have different code versus an Y developer versus someone who’s an
architect; they might want to look at lots of code.”

Utilization of the implementation showed improvement in permission management for
the new distributed version control system in the organization. There is no longer a
“special” unknown process in place, it all can be seen in one place.
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“What I do think is better about this compared to even old implementation
is everything is in one place now versus, for example, with the China
developers they have to sign a form. All of that was managed completely
external to the old centralized version control system itself. It involved
emailing the admins and getting a form signed in some third system and
then admin says it’s okay and finally they’re allowed to go and have a
system account. It was a lot of overhead outside of the system that’s not
even… The system had no idea any of that’s happening. I think now it is
better that your implementation as well as your design kind of brings it all
into a single place, which just was not there right. It involved admins and I
knowing there’s some special process in place”

The CSIS design artifacts were demonstrated to be equivalent to SARC. CSIS artifacts
also added more security controls over the system design. CSIS artifacts helped achieve a
secure transition to a new management system to distributed version control. The designs
helped increase security awareness amongst participants
“The design made me think about security. The design model used roles,
subjects and objects, I suspected these terms come from security, I had to
look it up.”
“roles do not go straight into any activities they want but there’s all those
little green and yellow context boxes that are in play as well”

The SIS design developed using CSIS artifact generated higher security
awareness than SIS developed using SARC for experienced IS practitioners and
security experts, which supports the third research hypothesis.

One of the meta-design requirements for secure system design (Siponen et al., 2006) “SIS
design methods should provide modeling support at the three levels of ISD
(organizational, conceptual, and technical) for abstract representation and operations to
specify the three essential elements of secure systems: threats, objects, and security
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features (safeguards or controls).”. The resulting design at SC may appear to weakly
support this requirement since it did not directly describe threats to the system e.g.
phishing emails or possible malware downloaded to the system. One of the participants
commented,
“I didn’t see anything in the diagram related to the threats that exist. But I
don’t see the actual threat of an outside attacker shown in the diagram.”

However, the design described security features in terms of safeguards and controls on
all levels. The design introduced risk measures to areas where threats may occur. A
simple attack tree (Cipriano et al., 2011) can be extracted from the design artifact.
The project design required technically skilled practitioners with abstract design thinking.
However, one of the participants was not technically skilled and so did not see the design
of either SARC or CSIS as applicable to IS development. Referring to SARC complexity
during design, a participant said,

“I cannot believe someone published this”

They thought that these artifacts do a good job at defining requirements and they are
necessary but not sufficient,

“if we were to just take this and send it off to somebody to implement, its
may not be sufficient for implementation…. implement it, And secondly, I
don’t think the diagram has anything to do with indicating methods for
implementation. So in implementation you could use, you know, a SQL
database. You could use something that’s part of the tool if it was available.
You could use a flat file. You could put all this data on some TechSpot. Like
there’s nothing about any structures or storage or APIs or access for
anything that is implementation oriented specified here. This looks to me
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like a diagramming of what the various types of access paths are, and this
one is basically role-based. It doesn’t even say, I guess… So yes, this shows
here’s the roles, here’s what they can do. Could you implement this? I think
this is necessary but not sufficient for an implementation.”

That participant felt that they could not go from these artifacts straight to coding; they
suggested possible use of classical flow chart artifacts and descriptions of “data
structures” to supplement the design to provide a complete toolset for implementations.
It can be considered if further UML can enable and supplement CSIS artifacts for
implementation as long as they meet the security requirements.

Other participants felt that the artifacts are sufficient for coding. The inexperienced
participant was a bit outdated on development methods, the project manager commented
on the feedback provided by that participant,
“And I think a lot of us, or at least I personally was trapped in a lot of well,
in the old thing, this happens, so that’s a concern – even though we’ve
probably fixed by now as well. I mean, I don’t think that’s any problem with
the model or the design process you went through. I think that’s a problem
with the people participating and the project itself.”

4.6. Discussion
The action research conducted at SC consisted of five research cycles. In the first
research cycle, the intervention was the introduction of a system design for a
management system. Research cycles were exploratory iterations that refined the design
artifact and the system design. A focus group was conducted to confirm the utility of the
design artifact and to test research hypothesis. Next, the results of these interventions are
summarized and evaluated.
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During this action research study, the researcher explored the relevance, applicability,
and feasibility of the CSIS design to the organization. In addition, the researcher took an
active role in solving a practical problem experienced by the host organization. The
researcher worked on implementing a secure system that prevented IS security violations
found during security audits and increased security awareness.

As part of its transition towards a cloud release cadence, the organization was moving
towards distributed version control systems. The researcher worked closely with IS
employees including participants and developers involved in managing these systems and
subsystems to enable a transition to secure system design and processes. The CSIS design
provided a guideline for implementing a management system for these systems. The
researcher was responsible for developing secure IS design for the transition towards
distributed version control during the first research cycle. His further responsibilities
included acting as a system implementer.
Supporting evidence for the second research hypothesis was found in the intervention
results. The focus group discussion showed that CSIS is more superior to SARC in utility
and ensuring IS security. Supporting evidence for the third research hypothesis was found
during the focus group.

4.7. Conclusion
This research was conducted to solve the information security gap in the existing research
by developing a theoretically grounded and comprehensive approach on how to design a
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secure IS that can be integrated into all IS development stages. A software development
organization was engaged in action research. Interviews were conducted with participants
involved in the organizational project of moving towards cloud release cadence.

Action research was conducted to ensure the utility of the artifact in solving the stated
problem and to test the hypotheses. The themes that emerged from the interviews were
sufficient to conduct the design based on CSIS. The resulting design increased security
awareness of participants as was evident during action research results evaluation.

According to interviews data analysis, the CSIS artifact meets Siponen et al., (2006)
meta-design requirements. Supporting evidence for each of the meta-requirements was
found and described during action research. Ensuring the security of the context in which
people should be allowed to perform activities was found to ensure system security.
Interviews also demonstrated that organizational context of business processes can be
assigned a violation level. This helps identify high-risk attack surfaces in system design.
The interviews helped include this design concept in the CSIS artifact.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1. Introduction
This dissertation aimed at developing a theoretically grounded secure system design
method. The CSIS artifact was developed to meet secure system meta-design
requirements (Siponen et al., 2006) in a way that can be integrated into all IS
development stages from requirements to deployment. An artifact was developed using
design science paradigm. The truth and utility of CSIS artifact were evaluated via
demonstration, action research and a focus group. This is summarized in Table 10.

Table 10. Design Science Research Validity Criteria (Hevner et al., 2004)
Design Science Research Validity Criteria

Research Study

Truth (justified theory or true statements
corresponding with real world phenomena)

OrBAC as kernel theory
(Kalam et. al, 2003)

Utility (building artifacts that are effective)

Action research
Focus group
Adaptability to IS design
(Siponen et. al, 2006)

A new design model and method are presented for consideration. Then, a review of
accepted evaluation criteria for qualitative research and how this study meets the
principles is presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion.
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5.2. Research Findings
In the first step, current SIS design approaches were reviewed. Analysis showed that
current design models suffered from applicability issues to IS. Using design science
research (Hevner et al., 2004), a design model was developed from a socio-technical
perspective to enable applicability to SIS design. IS literature suggested that the most
common organizational role of IS security, was socio-technical (Hirschheim & Klein,
1992), Baskerville (1992), Dhillon & Backhouse (2001), Siponen (2002) and D'Aubeterre
et al., (2008). IS security is dependent not only on technical solutions but also on users’
behavior.

As with literature, the CSIS artifact suggests that the organizational role in information
security is socio-technical. The context of activities in which the CSIS design draws IS
security from a socio-technical perspective. The truth and utility of the CSIS artifact
(Hevner et al., 2004) were evaluated using two methods (See Table 10).

The first method is descriptive (using scenarios and informed argument). Consequently,
the applicability of the artifact was tested using descriptive methods and was compared to
Siponen’s enriched use cases for equivalence. The CSIS artifact demonstrated its
usefulness in capturing security requirements during early stages of IS design (see
Section 3.5).

In the second method, observational evaluation was conducted where the artifact was
utilized in an action research study. The artifact was used in an organization to prove its

106
applicability to IS design. After several research iterations of applying the artifact in an
organizational design, the artifact was revised until no more possible improvements were
found. CSIS theory was adjusted according to practical outcome (Baskerville & Myers
2004). The artifact is described in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10. Final CSIS Design artifact

CSIS was found to meet SIS meta-design requirements (Siponen et al., 2006) when
deployed in an action research intervention.
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5.3. Research Results
Analysis of data collected from action research interviews and focus group confirmed the
hypotheses are supported. The design was found superior in terms of securing IS assets in
addition to information equivalence (Table 11). The CSIS artifacts provided different
possible contexts for the business process activities, employees no longer needed to bend
rules to achieve business objectives.

In addition, the CSIS artifacts provided sufficient abstraction to secure the system
objects. Views provided greater separation amongst objects based on the objective. This
information cannot be defined within a SARC artifact.

Table. 11 Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis
H1 SIS design developed using CSIS artifact is
informationally equivalent to SIS design developed
using security enriched use cases or SARC.
H2 SIS design developed using CSIS artifact will
generate higher security awareness than SIS
developed using security enriched use cases or
SARC.
H3 SIS design developed using CSIS artifact will
generate higher security awareness than SIS
developed using security enriched use cases or
SARC for experienced IS practitioners and security
experts.

Supported
Yes

Yes

Yes

Defining contexts when conducting system design activities increased the participant’s
awareness to the system security workflows. Using CSIS, IS security design takes a
balanced view of end-user related and technical issues allowing for IS security awareness
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to have a balance as well. Future research should investigate other possible forms of
context or constructs that heavily affect business processes contexts.

Assigning business processes context different risk levels helped highlight possible attack
surfaces to the implemented system. The colors in the design indicated the level of threat
if the context was violated. This was found during action research cycles and not during
the original design of CSIS. Future research should investigate possible prevention
systems based on context violations.

Action research was perceived to be a suitable research strategy for testing the CSIS
design artifact and adapting the resultant design. To summarize, the action research
experiences indicate that practitioners perceived the design model for SIS design as
relevant and feasible. In addition, it was easily applied to development and deployment of
a management system. Developing a secure code management system for newly adopted
distributed code repositories enabled validating the utility of CSIS in an organizational
setting.

5.4. Research Validity Criteria
This research study applied design science paradigm in addition to conducting action
research. Therefore, this research must meet design science and action research validity
criteria. Both aspects are discussed here.
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Design Science artifact must prove to be useful in solving a problem (Peffers et al.,
2007). The CSIS artifact proved useful in securing the information system. It can thus be
seen as valid in terms of artifact truth and utility. The use of OrBAC as kernel theory
provides evidence for the truth of the artifact. The demonstration provided in the third
chapter describing booking scenario provides evidence for the utility of the artifact.

Action research interventions were successful providing utility in the organization and
IS. We applied Baskerville &Wood-Harper (1998) validity criteria for IS action research
to ensure the validity of research as described in section 3.6. See Table 12.

Table. 12 Action Research Validity Criteria Baskerville & Wood-Harper (1998)
Action Research Validity
Criteria
Multivariate social situation
Interpretive frame
Researcher actions intervened
in the research setting
The method of data collection
included participatory
observations
Changes in the social setting
were studied
The immediate problem in
the social setting was
resolved during the research
Actions are based on theory


Research Study
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

The research should be set in multivariate social situations. The action
research was conducted with various employees of the company, involving
various relationships between the participants.

110


The observations should be recorded and analyzed in an interpretive frame.
Existing IS users were interviewed during the problem analysis phase, during
action planning and when the results of the action research cycles were evaluated.
The interviews were stored throughout in the form of field notes. The field notes
were then analyzed in an interpretive frame.



Researcher actions should intervene in the research setting. The researcher
worked actively and directly with the employees of the host organization. The
researcher was responsible for designing and delivering the secure IS design. This
entails that this research also complied with the requirement of practical action
(Baskerville and Myers 2004).



The method of data collection should include participatory observation.
Interviews, participatory observations, follow-ups, and questionnaires were used.
The researcher had the opportunity to spend some time at the company and gain
approval to conduct research. This provided a good opportunity for participatory
observation.



Changes in the social setting should be studied. The outcome of the research
was critically assessed with reference to the focus group views of the success of
both the IS design success and security of said IS. Several employees were asked
for the effectiveness of security on the newly implemented system. This means
that this dissertation also fulfilled the requirement of socially situated action
(Baskerville and Myers 2004).



The immediate problem in the social setting must have been resolved during
the research. A prototype implementation for a management system was
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provided. The current organizational problem was resolved during the study
according to the evaluations made by focus group.


The research should illuminate a theoretical framework that explains how
the actions led to a favorable outcome. The actions within the action research
cycles are linked to OrBAC as kernel theory of our proposed secure information
system design. CSIS provided the theoretical framework for designing a secure
information system. A secure management system was a favorable outcome for
the organization. This also means that this dissertation complies with the
requirement of an explicit underlying theory before an action (Baskerville and
Myers 2004).

The research findings support the research hypotheses in this study. This indicates that
the design principle behind CSIS is valid. Contextually driven system design ensures
system security. Context awareness in the design of the information system provides
controls that help ensure IS security implementation. Implications of research for
academia and practices is presented. Finally, limitations of research and proposed future
research are discussed.

5.5. Research Contributions
The main contribution is a secure information system design principle that meets welldefined criteria (Siponen et al., 2006). This research introduced the use of context from a
socio-technical perspective to IS design. In order to secure the processes of information
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system in an organization, it is fundamental to understand the context of organizational
processes and activities. Secure system design must shift towards contextualism (Tejay,
2008).

This research introduced the use of CSIS artifact to develop secure systems. CSIS enables
capturing sociotechnical and security aspects from as early as requirements stages of
system design. System design using CSIS ensures system security.

This research extended the uses of an access control model to secure system
methodology. This research used OrBAC principles of access control and applied them to
develop secure systems. CSIS used OrBAC constructs to describe how contextual,
emergent and changing requirements can be incorporated into the design of IS. CSIS
introduced the use of context in OrBAC in IS design. It allowed bridging a research gap
by explaining how a socio-technical secure design approach can be integrated into actual
IS design.

This research introduced a better secure IS design artifact than SARC. CSIS is
informationally equivalent to SARC. Moreover, SIS design developed using CSIS artifact
will generate higher security awareness than SIS developed using SARC.

CSIS is an empirically tested artifact. Artifact use was demonstrated via use case
scenarios. Action research and focus group were used to evaluate the design artifact. This
helped ensure the artifact utility and the research rigor.
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From a research methodology perspective, this research introduced the use of action
research in design science. Multiple methods were used to satisfy design science validity
criteria of truth and utility. This research adds to design artifact evaluation methods
described in Table 4 (Hevner et al., 2004). The use of action research in evaluating the
artifact allowed for testing the utility of the CSIS artifact. Use of focus group and
interviews for evaluation phase of design science.

5.6. Implications for Practice
The CSIS artifact provides an easy design method for systems to IS practitioners. The
CSIS design method can be easily adapted to IS development methods as the data
analysis indicates from action research. The CSIS design artifact can also help the
organization transition their development methods e.g. DevOps or any future
development method as the CSIS design easily adapts to forthcoming methods.

The CSIS artifact is useful to organizations transitioning towards cloud cadence. System
design using CSIS proved helpful in having control and visibility over permission
management in distributed source control systems. System design with process context in
mind will help ensure security in multi-tenant architectures.

5.7. Limitations
Design science produces new creative and innovative artifacts designed to solve an
organizational problem (Simon, 1996). CSIS is a new creative and innovative that was
empirically tested in an organizational setting for solving a problem. Since the research is

114
of qualitative nature, the results are based on the researcher’s interpretation. Research
bias is part of qualitative research.

However, the aim was to minimize bias by assessing the utility of the system in action
research and assessing the design in a focus group. Bias in this research was mitigated.
The analysis focused on the research problem and validating the argument. The research
was thoroughly validated from both action research and design science perspectives.

Action research does not aim to find general or universal mechanistic-causal laws.
Rather, it aims at the provision means to take systematic action to resolve specific
problems in practice (Stringer, 2013). However, at the same time, the relevant design
methods need to be validated through successful use as was the case in this study.

In the action research processes described in this research, the goal was to solve practical
problems experienced by the host organizations and to understand them and the results
achieved from the viewpoint of theory. While action research system implementation
results may not be generalizable, but they are of use in the host organization. In addition,
the CSIS design artifact is utilizable in similar organizations as a point of departure in
designing a secure system.

5.8. Future Research
While the context construct was well utilized in the CSIS artifact. The researcher still
believes there are still further research investigations to be conducted with business
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process contexts. The CSIS artifact can be further validated in a different organizational
context. Future research should investigate other possible forms of context or possibly
constructs that heavily affect business processes contexts. Risk levels of system contexts
can be great indicators of system attack. Future research should investigate possible
prevention systems based on context violations.

5.9. Conclusion
This dissertation consisted of two research steps. In the first step, since existing design
models that captures socio-technical aspects of the system design suffer from
applicability issues to IS, the researcher investigated how to design a secure system that
considers security requirements from early stages of IS design. Following the design
science research paradigm, this research built and evaluated an artifact designed to meet
this driving business need and provided applicable knowledge to secure business
processes. The introduced artifact captured the security role in the organization. The role
of security in the organization is socio-technical.

In the second step, action research was conducted in an organization to ensure the utility
of the artifact. The design artifact was revised during five research cycles. Research
findings indicated the possibility of weighting attack risks based on a business process
context. Using the artifact helped improve the security awareness of the users. A focus
group was conducted to validate that the artifact does not miss information that may be
included other approaches in IS literature to secure business process design. The
interventions also indicate that CSIS meets secure system meta-design requirements.
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For scholars, the use of context in IS design was introduced. It allowed bridging a
research gap by explaining how a socio-technical secure design approach can be
integrated into actual IS design. For IS practitioners, the CSIS artifacts provide an easy
method to design a secure system. While more research and practical studies are needed
on context, the experience gained from the action research interventions in an
organization indicated that the CSIS design artifact for IS design was relevant to
developing secure systems in practice.
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Appendix A.
Background and influences of different SIS approaches 1 (Siponen, 2002)

1

The arrow shows influences. The dotted lines illustrate a weak influence.
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Generations of SISD (Siponen, 2002)
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Appendix B.
Define Relationship in the OrBAC model (El Kalam et al., 2003)

OrBAC relationships
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Appendix C.
CSIS artifact for SC
Cycle 1
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CSIS artifacts for SC
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